

# Transnational and robust proximity policing: complementary and adaptive

Gendarmerie-like forces in future international missions

J.L. Hovens  
The Hague, October 2019



**Transnational  
and robust  
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Koninklijke Marechaussee



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## FOREWORD

For a period of one year, we had the honour of presiding over the International Association of Gendarmeries and Police Forces with Military Status, better known by its abbreviation: FIEP. During the presidency of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee, the future of the FIEP forces was the central focus.

Since our last presidency in 2010 much has changed in the world around gendarmerie-like forces. Transnational crime, conflicts, migration flows, terrorism, expanding economies, environmental change and climate change, these are developments that affect us and demand ever more from us; sufficient reason to assess our future and adjust ourselves to this future. An adjustment which, for me, must be based on partnership, complementarity and sound self-awareness.

The publication in front of you is the result of the efforts made by the pool of experts and upcoming talents from our member organisations. Their contributions and opinions were discussed and critically assessed on the basis of the increasing volume of relevant academic literature. Although each of my colleagues has had the opportunity to reflect on the result, this publication is not a consolidated document reflecting the opinion of FIEP, nor the presidency of this association. It is merely meant as *'food for thought'* to help all of us to be better prepared for the future.

I would like to pay tribute to all of those who played a role in organising and conducting the seminar and expert meetings. I am also grateful to all of those who wrote an essay, participated in the seminar and expert-meetings, and – by doing so – provided input. Their input, based on their assessment of trends and possible trends or their personal ambitions or dreams, has been invaluable. Bearing in mind the words of Eleanor Roosevelt - *"The future belongs to those who believe in the beauty of their dreams"* -, the future belongs to them.

A special word of thanks goes to the author of this publication. Allow me to express the hope that it will provide new incentive to the way we are preparing ourselves for the future and future international missions.

**Hans Leijtens,**  
Lieutenant General  
Commander Royal Netherlands Marechaussee  
The Hague, October 2019

## PROLOGUE

*Thursday 11 October 2035 – Rome, hyperloop station, platform 4. Blue-green laser lighting (LED was replaced long ago) creates a soothing and relaxing atmosphere in the station. I am waiting for the arrival of my capsule that will take me to Amsterdam. In a short while I'll be home, thanks to initiator Elon Musk and the many scientists who made this possible! The second five-yearly meeting of the Global Federation of Gendarmerie-like Forces (GFGLF) has just ended. Although they were exciting and inspiring days, the summit was overshadowed by the tidal wave that hit the metropolis of Mumbai. Despite earlier warnings, coastal reinforcements were only started very recently. The island of Salsette in the Arabian Sea and large areas of Mumbai Suburban were flooded and millions of people have fled. The government of India requested the assistance of large gendarmerie units to help restore and maintain public order in its important but heavily affected region. Many participants of the GFGLF meeting (uniting 47 gendarmerie-like forces from all over the world) were called away to make such a deployment possible.*

*The sound of the station PA announces the arrival of my capsule. The sensor on the right side of the door recognises my face: "Welcome aboard, sir". The door opens and I take my seat. After I have fastened my seatbelts, the door closes silently, and the countdown starts. Here we go!*

*The world was praised for the breakthrough of nanotechnology in the 2020s and the discovery of ground-breaking gene therapy to halt the aging of the population of the western world and prevent Parkinson's disease. It makes it possible for me to stay fit and to continue to contribute to the 'good cause'. I close my eyes and 'run through' the summit once again.*

*Last Sunday, the representatives of the various gendarmerie-like forces arrived in Rome. It was a warm welcome and it felt good to see old friends again. It was already more than ten years ago that, due to the large number of FIEP members and the distinctly still different interests and possibilities on the different continents, that we decided to set up a worldwide federation and to establish separate gendarmerie associations on each continent. Whereas the federation strengthens the associations of gendarmerie-like forces on the different continents, initiates cooperation and encourages further professionalisation, the associations on each continent strive for more cooperation (where possible in the field of operations) between the member forces on each continent.*

*Many topics were put on the agenda of the GFGLF summit, but in general the talks and elaborations can be traced back to three main themes: the current security situation, trends for the future and the subsequent challenges for gendarmerie-like forces, and the further development of the federation and the continental associations of gendarmerie-like forces.*

*The current world is characterised by pressure on the nation state system and the international multi-polar order. These systems are proving unable to offer solutions (while remaining accountable to citizens) for the challenges and problems associated with rapid and complex changes. Everything seems to be interconnected and to influence each other. With the departure of the United Kingdom from the European Union in 2020, the diminishing belief in the Union became manifest. In many European countries, the voices of populist national parties became louder and louder, as did the protests of 'yellow vest' or 'gilets jaunes' movements and regions which until then had not been heard by national governments or the European Union.*

*After populist parties made substantial gains in the elections to the European Parliament in 2019, attention within the European Union shifted to the promotion of national interests. Although initially establish for deployment to police missions abroad, the European Gendarmerie Force – EUROGENDFOR - became involved in stopping migration flows and maintaining public order within Europe and becomes a European Agency in 2024. Europe is unable to cope with the further advance of China and the United States is rapidly losing interest in Europe under the leadership of President Trump, who was re-elected in 2020. Climate change, migration flows and trans-national organised crime and terrorism are problems to which no suitable answer has been found. It is becoming clear that the populist parties have a clear view of what they are against, but have no solution for the enormous problems Europe is confronted with. As a consequence, the populist nationalist parties are losing ground again in the elections in 2024 and pro-European parties are succeeding in turning the tide during the second half of the 2020s.*

*At the end of the 2020s, the European Union has become one of the main driving forces behind the development of innovative technologies and the search for alternative and sustainable resources, in order to be more independent of oil and gas suppliers and to safeguard the environmental conditions on earth for generations to come. The economy continues to flourish, and Europe is able to hold its own in the market against the increasing importance of China and the Indian subcontinent (after many years of conflict India and Pakistan are cooperating). Years of a policy of isolationism have put an end to the rule of the United States on the world stage.*

*Russia has tried to gain more influence in eastern Europe, but these efforts have greatly decreased in importance after the departure of Putin in 2025.*

*Climate change (although more and more states, non-governmental organisations and social movements are increasingly successful in their attempts to reverse the process), the growth of the population (and aging in certain regions of the world), urbanisation, the uneven distribution of scarce resources and migration are the global trends in the 2020s and the first part of the 2030s. At the same time, the enormous progress in the field of ICT is a reason for adjustment in the social domain. The Internet of Things is increasingly permeating daily life and blurring the physical and virtual worlds. There have been breakthroughs in research into artificial intelligence, while robotic technology will lead to service robots entering healthcare and social services in 2032. Cyber-crime is becoming a growing threat and the call for harsh and repressive enforcement by governments is getting louder. At the same time, IT developments evoke the question of whether the concept of privacy needs a review.*

*In the 2020s and the first half of the 2030s, security threats came from both states and non-state actors. Armed conflicts in Africa and South America, hybrid warfare, terrorist threats and attacks, such as during the Olympic Games in Prague in 2028 and -recently- the Olympic Games in New Delhi (2032), as well as crime and cyber crime, demanded an answer from the police, gendarmerie-like forces, the armed forces and private security organisations. As a result of these developments, the processes of militarisation of the police and constabularisation of the armed forces gained far-reaching momentum and the distinction between the two is becoming increasingly difficult to make. The developments within the security domain and their significance for the survival or existence of gendarmeries were central during our last summit. We agreed to come back to this in the short term and to include the trends for the coming period.*

*The second main theme during our summit in Rome referred to the trends for the future and the subsequent challenges for gendarmerie-like forces. The assignment to look at the period starting today and ending in 2050 turned out to be ambitious and difficult. The participants were inclined to talk only about the challenges of 2035 and 2036. After a degree of pushing and pulling by the moderators, finally a number of possible trends for the future were arrived at. The participants distinguished eleven trends: (1) a general trend concerns the ever-faster changes, growing uncertainty and complexity and increasing ambiguity; (2) a further growth of the world population that is rapidly aging, especially in Europe and North America; (3) the migration of the population to the urban areas on the coast. A region that -due to climate change*



and the associated rising sea level- is increasingly at risk; (4) a growing awareness of urgency to find and use enduring energy sources; (5) a growing need to look elsewhere in our planetary system for opportunities to grow food and establish colonies; (6) the internet of Things invades daily life and is considered the "new normal" (those who avoid these new technologies are considered 'old-fashioned'); (7) a strongly increasing connectedness that puts pressure on both social norms and traditional business models: privacy and other democratic values, as well as (intellectual) property are being redefined (and changed) and (repressive) control (also online) is increasingly accepted for safety's sake; (8) developments in the field of artificial intelligence, the Internet of Things and robot technology have put the issue of labour firmly on the map in all its aspects: how will the entrepreneurial nouveaux riches relate to the new subproletariat of the working poor? Are the rich going to live in 'gated communities', secured by advanced technologies, with the poor settling in expanding suburbs of cities? What significance does the new class difference have for the world in 2050? (9) the role and significance of nation states are declining in favour of larger and smaller regions, as well as non-state actors. At the same time, there is a growing awareness that problems can only be tackled through cooperation and that a world government must act in a coordinating manner. A search for the balance between an orientation on systems and structures on the one hand and values on the other is (re) started; (10) the increasing vulnerability of societies further reinforces the processes of militarisation of the police and constabularisation of the armed forces and will eventually lead to a merger, this merger having the monopoly of legitimate use of physical force; (11) the dividing line between war, terrorism and crime is becoming increasingly vague because the related activities are so closely intertwined and are beyond our control and ability to monitor due to the fact that a substantial part of these activities is happening in dark places on the internet. Where until the mid-twentieth century the emphasis was on detection and repression and around the turn of the millennium risk management and the prevention or stopping of unwanted activities were added to the palette, in the 2030s one sees that the state anticipates as if possible crime and acts as have already taken place. Started in the context of terrorism -in which precautionary measures were mainly legitimised due to the potential catastrophic extent of damage- pre-emptive actions increasingly spread to other regions of criminal law. The possibilities that artificial intelligence and, among other things, nanotechnology offer will most likely lead to the question of whether these technologies should not be used on potential perpetrators in order to prevent crime.

*At first glance, the challenges for gendarmerie-like forces are enormous. Most familiar with proximity policing in rural areas in the physical world, it seems questionable how these forces will 'survive' in the urban areas and in the virtual world that enables and creates cyber-crime. Besides this, it is uncertain whether an international police mission (being either a support mission or a replacement of the indigenous police) will still be necessary or desirable. However, the biggest challenge is the possible merger of police and armed forces, which could possibly make gendarmerie-like forces superfluous. On the other hand, gendarmerie-like forces, with their experience in both the military and the civilian worlds, are well equipped to play a leading role in the network structure needed to tackle the many security challenges. In order to be able to cope with the challenges, the participants agreed that the forces united in the GFGLF should draw up a vision document with a clear intent and a clear direction for the future. Based on the trends and listening and sensing other relevant actors, possible future scenarios must be developed, as well as robust policy options.*

*Due to the time needed to react to the natural disaster affecting the metropolis of Mumbai and the first surprise regarding the results of the discussions on the trends in the period 2036-2050 and the linked outcomes, the participants were unable to elaborate on the third main theme. Unfortunate! But understandable as well!*

*One hour later – finally entering Amsterdam hyperloop station. Almost home! I walk to my sky car powered by hydrogen (hybrid and e-cars are out!) that will quickly take me home, hovering above the Netherlands. "Luc, take me home," I call in the direction of the place where the microphone should be, and we leave. Floating in 'my Luc', I later start dictating a report on the summit...*

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# 1. INTRODUCTION

The prologue on the previous pages is primarily intended to break free from the daily concerns and to take the reader to a possible future scenario. By taking the year 2035 as a starting point and looking from there to the previous period, it is as if predictions have already come true and potential responses from the gendarmeries to the developments outlined in the period from today until 2035 are clear. In the prologue, possible trends are also extrapolated to the year 2050, and questions concerning future policing, security and gendarmerie-like forces are raised.

All in all, the previous pages seem to describe the possible future from only one perspective. Realising that the uncertainty about the possible future is only increasing, the prologue therefore also has a limitation. Two or more scenarios should preferably be used, in which alternative perspectives are outlined for the future and on the basis of which choices can be made for the further development of gendarmerie-like forces in general and their contribution to international police missions in particular. However, the efforts made during the Dutch FIEP presidency are reflected in the description of possible developments and possible reactions from the gendarmerie-like forces without any future scenarios, leading to one or more ‘policy options’ for these organisations.

## Background

The International Association of Gendarmeries and Police Forces with Military Status FIEP<sup>1</sup> was founded in 1994 to broaden and strengthen mutual relationships between the respective forces and to enhance in-depth reciprocal knowledge-sharing on security issues of common interest. Having started with a focus on the European Mediterranean region, over the past ten years the partnership evolved into an international association. Today, the association has 17 member forces and 2 observers scattered across the world. Other forces have applied for membership.

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<sup>1</sup> FIEP is the French acronym for *France, Italie, Espagne et Portugal* (France, Italy, Spain and Portugal), the countries of the gendarmeries that founded the International Association of Gendarmeries and Police Forces with Military Status.

In line with the decisions taken in the Preparatory Meeting in September 2018 in Izmir (Turkey), the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee, in charge of the FIEP presidency from October 2018 to October 2019, focused on a central theme during its presidency. This theme concerned the gendarmerie-like forces (understood as gendarmeries and police forces with military status) in an international context. More specifically, it addressed the employment of their capabilities in international missions.

The Dutch presidency provided an approach in which, in addition to organising a separate seminar on the subject, parallel sessions with the relevant experts were carried out during the regular commission meetings. In order to be able to determine whether and how the associated or affiliated FIEP forces approach their duties and activities in international missions (and under which denominator), and to be able to formulate the central theme even more sharply before the start of the presidency and to deepen the theme during the expert meetings, a questionnaire was sent to all FIEP members.

The initial theme had several aspects in common with the Dutch presidency in 2010 and even more with that of the Italian *Arma dei Carabinieri* in 2013. The Dutch Presidency in 2010 addressed the question of how (and with whom) the association could facilitate its expansion, as well as the question of the scope of the cooperation. In line with the last question, the impact of the 21<sup>st</sup> century security challenges on the mutual relationships and security issues of common interest was studied and the results were laid down in the seminar proceedings 'Gendarmeries and the security challenges the 21<sup>st</sup> century.'<sup>2</sup> The theme of 'international crisis management' was central during the Italian presidency in 2013, thereby mainly focusing on the information exchange regarding related sub-aspects by the then FIEP members and also providing insight into the European Union Police Services Training programme - EUPST 2011-2013.<sup>3</sup>

Unfortunately, there is no summary report (including ex-post evaluation)

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<sup>2</sup> J.L. Hovens, and G.A.G. van Elk (eds.), (2011). *Gendarmeries and the Security Challenges of the 21st Century*. The Hague, Royal Netherlands Marechaussee.

<sup>3</sup> A training project granted by the European Commission to the consortium led by the Italian Carabinieri (comprising the Spanish Guardia Civil, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National Gendarmerie, the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee, the Romanian Gendarmerie, the European Police College).

of the presentations and discussions on topics that took place during the Italian presidency. Minutes provide only a very general picture of what was presented and discussed but offer too little insight into the approach and working methods within the various forces.

It is also unfortunate that the survey held by the incoming Dutch presidency in 2018 gives a differentiated outcome: the perceived challenges, but also suggestions regarding the subjects that the presidency pays attention to, are quite different. Yet there seems to be a slight preference for looking at possibilities to further enhance interoperability, train and assign rapidly deployable units/specialised police teams and to enhance post-deployment evaluation.

As the survey offered limited guidance for the further elaboration of the theme during the Dutch presidency, the theme gradually shifted to the exploration of the characteristics of the long-term future and the implication(s) for gendarmerie-like forces in general, their operations (especially in international missions) and their mutual cooperation.

## Setting the scene

Today, hybrid security threats and challenges are more intense and wider than one could have expected in 2010. These threats are having an effect both nationally and internationally. As a consequence, the deployment of gendarmerie-like forces, both nationally and internationally, could come under pressure because of the -by nature- limited numbers of gendarmerie personnel.<sup>4</sup> Perhaps choices must be made. While some dispute a domestic

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<sup>4</sup> Police work is performed 24/7, close to society. Because of this, the police is perhaps the most manifest expression of rule of law, or - more in general - the government. Police forces are expected to respond to various transnational threats as well as failing or failed states in need of (police) assistance. In addition, and due to its 24/7 presence in society, the police is often - unintentionally - involved in cases with people with mental illnesses, and faces a (perceived) growth in anti-social behaviour. The demands placed on the police force by politicians and citizens seem to be increasing. At the same time, it is a myth that the police force can be everywhere and do everything regardless of its capacity. Capacity that may come under further pressure as a result of budgetary constraints. Therefore, deploying or involving police, or more specific gendarmerie-like forces, is a matter of prioritising and making choices. Both in the national and the international context. See a.o.: Jenny Fleming and Peter Grabosky (2009), 'Managing the Demand for Police Services, or How to Control an Insatiable Appetite', in *Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice*, Volume 3, Number 3, 281–291; Adam Edwards, Elke Devroe and Paul Ponsaers (2017), 'The European World of

role for gendarmerie-like forces, there seems to be consensus on their role in international crisis management operations.<sup>5</sup> It is often argued that the hybrid nature, military status, and other characteristics of gendarmerie-like forces offer unique advantages over civilian police forces.

It is exactly in this international context that the Dutch presidency wanted to start to elaborate on the significance of gendarmerie-like forces in future international missions, with consideration for the domestic demands made of these forces due to internal security threats and the changing characteristics of international crises.

The activities mentioned can be performed under the umbrella of different international organisations (e.g. the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)) and are defined in different ways, but all seem to appeal to the distinguishing characteristics of the gendarmeries. These characteristics enable them to police in less benign, less stable, or less secure environments on the one hand, and to act as a linchpin between the worlds of the military and civil police organisations on the other.

## Aim and method

The rationale to initiate the theme of the Dutch FIEP presidency is threefold. First of all, it must be recognised that the volatility, complexity and unpredictability of developments in general, now and in the future, will or could have consequences for the way organisations and more particularly gendarmerie-like forces organise and prepare themselves for the future. Furthermore, the interconnectedness of conflicts, criminality and terrorism and their unpredictable courses strongly influences the area of work of law

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Metropolitan Policing: interpreting patterns of governance, policy and politics', in Devroe, E., Edwards, A., Ponsaers, P. (eds.) (2017). *Policing European Metropolises, The Politics of Security in City-Regions*, London and New York, 303-331.; and H. Hovens (2017), 'The Future Role of Gendarmeries in National and International Contexts', in: *Stability Policing: A toolkit to project stability*, Vittorio Stingo, Michael J. Dziedzic and Bianca Barbu (Eds). Headquarters Supreme Allied Commander Transformation Norfolk, Virginia, United States, 212.

<sup>5</sup> E.g. M. Dewar, (1985). *The British Army in Northern Ireland*, Arms and Armour Press; M. Rasmussen, (1999). *The Military Role in Internal Defense and Security: Some Problems*. Occasional Paper #6. The Center for Civil-Military Relations, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.



enforcement organisations such as (amongst others) gendarmeries and call for a fast, flexible and appropriate response. Finally, emerging megatrends such as the growth of world population and the growth of the aging population in parts of the world, urbanisation, concentration in coastal areas, and growing digital connectivity,<sup>6</sup> have an undeniable influence on the nature, size and mission area for the future deployment of gendarmerie-like forces in international missions.

The central question that was addressed during the Dutch presidency was:

*What significance must or could be given to developments in the somewhat longer term, looking at future international missions of gendarmerie-like forces?*

In order to answer that question, the presidency organised four expert meetings in parallel with the meetings of the commissions for ‘Human Resources’, ‘Service Organisation’, ‘New Technologies and Logistics’ and ‘International Affairs’. In the discussions during these expert meetings the focus was always on the future. The current approach was considered to be a starting point only. Participating experts were challenged to look from outside their respective forces to the inside. In addition to the expert meetings, a separate path was followed in which a seminar was held on the basis of essays by younger representatives of the respective gendarmerie-like forces.

The first expert meeting was held in Amsterdam from 3 to 6 December 2018, parallel with the meeting of the Human Resources Commission. The starting point for the meeting ‘Future focus and the role of Human Resource Management’ was formed by the assumption that, just like large and small commercial companies and organisations, gendarmerie-like forces are dealing with the challenges of the present time and those of the near future. And that just as within those companies and organisations, the fundamental question

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<sup>6</sup> E.g. Kilcullen, David J. (2013). *Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerilla*. C. Hurst & Company Publishers; Norton, Richard J. (2003) Feral Cities in: *Naval War College Review* 66, no. 4 (Autumn 2003): 97-106; Arquilla, J. & Ronfelt D. (2001). *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. A plea for a more nuanced approach is given by e.g. Hills (Alice Hills, (2014). *Out of the Mountains: the Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla, Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 25:1, 236-241.)

that should be addressed within the respective gendarmerie forces was: what are the skills, strategies, competences and attitudes required to remain competent in the current turbulent world? Participating experts discussed the significance of possible future scenarios for the forces in general as well as for HRM departments and focused on four questions: (1) What trends do we foresee in the future? (2) What do these trends/this future mean for our organisations? (3) How to bridge present-day and future challenges? and (4) What can or should be done in the HRM domain in regard to the future? The outcomes of the expert meeting were set out in a draft report, including a number of critical questions asked by or on behalf of the Dutch presidency, and sent to the participants. These questions were in turn given consideration. The consolidated and shared views of the participants and their national ‘stakeholders or supporters’ were archived and are reflected in this publication.

The next expert meeting, entitled ‘Organising time for reflection’, was held in Lisbon from 11 to 14 March 2019. During the meeting, the participants focused on the concept of ‘the learning organisation’, taking knowledge and knowledge management as key enablers. Although the subject encompassed matters such as lessons identified, and lessons learned the discussions were broader. Matters such as (1) the role and experience of the own organisation to draw lessons from past, (2) the necessity of reflection; openness and possibilities for (self) reflection, (3) working on sustainable engagement among the members of gendarmeries, on an approach of problem-solving and a ‘learning culture’; and (4) the involvement of external research bodies in the event of an evaluation of their own actions, were also touched upon. Despite the fact that the subject also offered good starting points for the identification of building blocks for a joint research proposal that meets the requirements to apply successfully for external (international) research funds, no suggestions were made. Due to the fact that the expert meeting could not add substantial new information, it was decided that the outcome would only encompass the initial information handed out by the presidency before the meeting as well as the (bullet points) highlights of the expert meeting<sup>7</sup>.

The theme of the third expert meeting, organised in parallel with the meeting of the New Technologies and Logistics Commission in Rome from 15 to 18 April 2019 was ‘The blurring divide between real world and virtual world’.

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<sup>7</sup> Notes taken during the meeting and handed over to the presidency were archived.

The experts focused on the growing interconnectedness between people and organisations in the physical world and the latest developments of information and communication technology (ICT, also considered the main driver for change) that can be connected to the virtual world. Participants elaborated on the availability and effective use of such technology in policing and future international missions of gendarmerie-like forces. Matters that were touched upon: (1) maintaining public order and security, providing help to the citizens, preventing and detecting crime while upholding and respecting the standards for 'good policing'; (2) building community trust in police and the role of social media; (3) the question whether or not monitoring social media can prevent public disorder, protests, rebellion or the internal destabilisation; (4) the possibility that social media can support police operations? And if so, how?; (5) what lessons are or could be drawn for future international missions? (6) what regulations could or should be applied towards members of gendarmerie-like forces? After the meeting, a report was drafted on the subject with both input from the participating experts and expertise from the Dutch presidency. The concept was distributed among the participants for additions and comments and also formed the basis for this final report by the Dutch presidency.

The final expert session was held in Ankara from 24 to 27 June 2019 and was entitled 'Aligning concepts with future operational demands'. A systematic collection of data and information on the contribution of gendarmerie-like forces in the (sustainable) establishment of public order and security in international missions was central during the meeting. The theme was approached in two sequential steps. In the first step, the participants determined what constitutes 'good' or 'successful' (international) policing. In the second step, the experts elaborated on appropriate indicators enabling the forces to measure the degree of success. In the discussions, two aspects were of relevance: (1) the measurement of outputs and outcomes of contributions of gendarmerie-like forces to international missions; (2) involvement of (independent) academics and/or research institutes in the development of instruments and the actual measuring process. Matters that were touched upon were: (1) the meaning of good or successful policing in general and a possible difference in case of international missions; (2) the pillars to which the defined indicators are linked; (3) the defined indicators; (4) the already existing tool(s) to measure the outputs and outcomes; (5) the involvement of independent academics and/or research institutes involved

with measuring outputs and outcomes; (6) the role that FIEP could play in this respect. Owing to time constraints, no report was written. Instead the Dutch presidency used the introduction to the theme and the notes taken to finalise this publication.

Apart from the somewhat more restricted set-up of the expert meetings, in parallel with the various annual meetings of the FIEP commissions, the Dutch FIEP presidency launched a longer-running project in which a mix of ideas and opinions of mid-level gendarmerie officers formed the input for a seminar held in Amsterdam from 18 to 21 February 2019. A substantial part of the 'FIEP community' reacted to Dutch presidency's request and delivered essays. Some forces even delivered more than one essay. All the essays were evaluated and summarised in a report that was handed out to the participants of the seminar. Where necessary or deemed desirable, references are made to the essays. The summary report served as input for the discussions and further elaborations that took place during the seminar. Based on the essays and the subsequent discussions held during the seminar, a draft summary report was written and distributed amongst the participants of the seminar in order to verify whether it was an accurate reflection of what was written and discussed. In line with the comments received on the summary report, a consolidated summary report was compiled. This consolidated report was sent to the respective general headquarters for a first reflection. The outcomes were evaluated, additional information processed, and final amendments were made.

Unlike the original set-up, the essays and the subsequent seminar report together with the outcomes of the expert meetings have been merged into one publication. This is to prevent unnecessary repetition, especially in the sketches of the future.

Finally, because the entire process was carried out with input from representatives of the various gendarmerie-like forces and the organisation of the process by the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee influenced (whether or not consciously) the outcomes of this report, the results have been supplemented -wherever possible- with insights from existing literature and the final report has been reviewed by peers.

## Structure of the report

Thinking about the very long-term future and the potential impact on gendarmerie-like forces requires a two-step approach: first, the question will have to be addressed how that future might look like. After this first step, it will be possible to look at the possible consequences for the forces.

This report consists of three parts. In the first part a possible future scenario is described. The first chapter of part one starts with an outline of the future. Different trends are described. Attention is paid to the changing nature of the developments: the rate of change increases exponentially, the growing uncertainty about what will happen in the future, the increasing complexity of things, as well as the growing ambiguity.

As information and communication technology is considered the main driver for change, and the omnipresence of advanced technology and its applications influence policing (in general and that of the gendarmerie-like forces in particular) in many ways, this subject is given special attention in a separate chapter.

Part two elaborates on the possible answers to the future challenges. Chapter four starts with an elaboration on the possible consequences and actions for the gendarmerie-like forces.

The next chapter focuses on the possible consequences for international cooperation and international missions.

In part three, a number of reflections and recommendations based on the outcomes of the work of the Dutch presidency are given.

# PART ONE THE FUTURE

*“Change is the law of life. And those who look only to the past or the present are certain to miss the future.”*

*(John F. Kennedy)*

## 2. WHAT THE FUTURE MIGHT LOOK LIKE

### Setting the context


In 2010, members of FIEP tasked the Dutch presidency with assessing the relevance, potential role and mandate, as well as the added value of gendarmeries, in the following years.<sup>8</sup> In this context a seminar was held in December, in which the security challenges of the 21st century formed the starting point.

Who in 2010 could have predicted the attacks carried out by the Norwegian right-wing radical critic Anders Behring Breivik, the crash of MH17, the attacks in Brussels, Paris, at the Christmas markets in Berlin and recently Strasbourg, the attacks in, for example, Istanbul and Nairobi, the cancellation of the 1988 *Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty*, or the extensive migration flows from regions such as the Middle East and North Africa to Europe? And who could have thought of the protests against the tax burden, the government policy, the power of the European Union (EU), globalisation and the rise of the *les gilets jaunes* (yellow vests) in France, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands? Or the students in Sweden, Belgium and the Netherlands that go on strike to protest for a stricter climate policy?

In 1964, Bob Dylan sang *The Times They are A-Changing*. There is with no doubt that the world changed during the 70s, 80s, and 90s of the last century; however, since the 1990s the world has been changing more quickly and has become more complex. As such, this change and complexity is not new. What is new is the scale of the information available about the changes, the speed of change, as well as the fact that it is becoming less and less clear what will happen in the future, meaning that uncertainty will therefore increase. What could make the future even more unclear and uncertain is the fact that events or changes can vary to a smaller or larger extent on each of the four axes (see table 1).

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<sup>8</sup> Hans Hovens, (2011) General Introduction: Towards Understanding the Potential of Gendarmeries, in J.L. Hovens, and G.A.G. van Elk (eds.) *Gendarmeries and the Security Challenges of 21st Century*, The Hague, Royal Netherlands Marechaussee, 2011, 9-25.



Megatrends such as the acceleration of the emergence of new technologies, the growth of the world population, urbanisation (and the concentration of this population in coastal areas), climate change and resources that are becoming increasingly scarce (and the imbalance in the presence and disposal of them) give rise to the nature, direction and extent of changes and subsequent increasing mobility. These trends and changes have an impact on social life, national and international politics and relations as well as on local and global economies. One can observe an upsurge of internal protests and conflicts and conflicts between states and between states and non-state actors - including extremist violence - due to inequities in the distribution of wealth, the availability of resources, the presence of geopolitical arguments within international relations, and the lack of the ability and possibility for politicians to come up with sensible, easy, simple and accepted solutions for sometimes perceived problems. Another observation that can be made is the influx of migration flows of people who want to flee (armed) conflicts or natural disasters or look for a better future (shelter, food, work, education). The direction of change is largely determined by two basic or core uncertainties: the (perceived or desired) dependency (autonomy versus mutual dependence)



on one hand and the motives and drivers for our thinking and acting (systems versus values) on the other hand.<sup>9</sup>

In trying to describe today's situation, one could argue that the world has become more and more interdependent and interconnected over the last decades. National and foreign policy have become more transnational, and the traditional distinction between internal and external security has blurred. The (perceived) upsurge in international organised crime and terrorism has been mirrored by a further transnational approach in law enforcement efforts and police and the military, public and private responsibility for security seems to be blurring in most countries. Another observation that can be made concerns the blurred line between crime control and warfare: dealing with transnational risks (including terrorism and organised crime) and migration across national borders, as well as (trans)national and international responses to threats, often relies on the military and military forms of control.

In the project on future international missions, the contributors point to the developments of international (police) missions under the umbrella of the EU, the United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Special reference is made to the increasingly intense and the broadening of hybrid security threats. They also refer to the difficulty of defining the status of the various actors in the mission area: are they combatants, terrorists, insurgents, refugees or innocent civilians? Finally, they point to the rise and consequences of the concept of human security in terms of a more encompassing understanding of safety and security, with a focus on groups and individuals living in states rather than on the security of the states themselves.

One can conclude that - not foreseen in 2010 - the world of 2019 has indeed undergone great change and that today's security threats and other challenges are more intense and wider than expected in 2010. As was concluded at the time and described in the seminar proceedings, the trends recognised

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<sup>9</sup> See e.g.: *Scenariotraject KMar 2015, Een toekomstverkenning voor de Koninklijke Marechaussee in 2025* (Scenario project KMar 2015, A future exploration for the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee in 2025), Royal Netherlands Marechaussee, 2015.

at that time seemed to be in line with the distinguishing characteristics of gendarmeries, characteristics that enable the gendarmeries to police in less benign, less stable, or less secure environments, and to act as a linchpin between the worlds of the military and civil (police) organisations. The developments of the last ten years and the trends that can be recognised for the next ten to twenty years, raise the question of whether the outcomes reached back then are still valid.

### **Trends for the future revisited**

Emerging megatrends will have - as described above - implications for the future, for future international relations, for future conflicts, and for the future of mankind. Trends are: (1) climate change; (2) the growth and aging of the world's population and the flows of people who have drifted in search of shelter, freedom and income; (3) the imbalance in the presence and disposal of increasingly scarce resources; (4) the exponential speeding up of technological developments and its impact through worldwide implementation; and (5) the growing (digital) connectivity and the ever-growing interconnectedness and intertwining of economies.

Taking the trends for the future as a starting point or as root causes for conflict, the experts in the various meetings also pointed to the possible (and for gendarmerie-like forces relevant) effects:

- the further rise of (transnational) organised crime, related to migration flows, conflicts, and/or related to inequities in wealth, the possibilities the global economies 'offer', or the possibilities to influence the seated political power to the benefit of opposition groups or criminal organisations;
- the positive and negative, possibly radical, impacts that the application of new technologies can bring about (e.g. far-reaching changes in the labour market, unemployment, new possibilities to collect and evaluate big data, the emergence of ethical themes and questions of security, privacy and autonomy, the effects of a blurring divide between real world and virtual world, cybercrime).

The experts emphasised the possible emergence of social movements due to (the perception of) certain groups finding that their voices are not heard

or taken seriously. Resisting the more powerful and advantaged elites and focusing on specific political or social issues, they use social media to facilitate civic engagement and collective action in order to effect, resist, or undo social change. This could even involve calling on and using violence as a means to be heard.

In the next few paragraphs, the possible consequences for the relationship between internal and external security, the shifting (security) paradigms, and the development of international relations will be described in succession. Over the past decades people, organisations and states have become increasingly interdependent and interconnected. Foreign policy therefore has ever more domestic consequence, while conversely domestic policy can harm foreign interests. The turn of the century can be characterised as a period in which the distinction between internal and external security, the police and the military, as well as public and private responsibility for security faded in many countries. Even where transnational security risks (including terrorism and organised crime) cross national borders, and national and international responses to these threats often rely on the armed forces and military forms of control, the boundary between crime control and warfare is blurring.

Three developments can explain this blurring boundary between internal and external security: the fall of the Iron Curtain (as a symbol of an external threat that results in a distinction between internal and external security); the process of globalisation (transnational organised crime, migration, technology and environment) and the blurring of former external borders. The increasing involvement of the military in internal security in most countries (especially in the US and Europe) as a result of the terrorist threat in the first years of the twenty-first century can now be added to these developments.

Finding an answer to violent crime and adapting to new roles and responsibilities in the arenas of both national and international security also seems to blur the boundary between police and army.

The shifting security paradigm is the next aspect that needs to be addressed. The last century showed a transformation of the concept of security from the concept of the 'night watch state' (state focuses on external security and internal law and order), through the welfare state (state protects and promotes

the social and economic well-being of its citizens), to the concept of human security (a more comprehensive understanding of safety and security, with a focus on groups and individuals living in states, rather than state security). Security, safety, prosperity and identity became increasingly subjects that are important to citizens.

Global trends such as the globalisation of crime and subsequent responses, as well as the privatisation, pluralisation and hybridisation of security, resulted in what is described by various authors as a 'shifting security paradigm'. This shift in turn gradually leads to a reorientation of the role of the state and the role of other actors (both governmental and non-governmental) and citizens in the realisation of security. An important element related to the debate on shifting security paradigms relates to the theory of the social contract. Although this theory states that the legitimacy of state authority over the individual results from a (hypothetical) contract between the state and its citizens, some authors believe that this contract is at stake: either because at present new leadership is needed,<sup>10</sup> or because (as is also argued) any normative system (created by anyone) that can give people a sense of security and order and has a high degree of predictability leads to an acceptance of the (enforcement of) the rules set.

The ever-increasing interconnectedness, interdependence and complexity that go hand in hand with globalisation intensified the effects on politics and international relations.

The effect of foreign policy on domestic affairs - and vice versa - increased and the interdependence between security and development was accepted. Traditional boundaries between internal and external security, the fight against war and crime, the police and the armed forces and public and private security actors. At the same time, the role of the state with regard to social control systems seems to be changing (sometimes in favour of non-state actors).

There are two opposing views within international relations. In the first view, security, prosperity and the solution of global problems such as the

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<sup>10</sup> R. van Wijk, (2017). *De nieuwe revolutionaire golf; Waarom burgers zich van hun leiders afkeren*. Amsterdam University Press.

environmental crisis, climate change and food supply can only be achieved through close international cooperation. The second view exudes a policy of realism. International relations are based on geopolitics and states always put their own interests first.

The global financial crisis (2008) and prolonged economic stagnation coincided with an increase in refugee flows, a shift in economic and political power, and the emergence or flare-up of rebellions and local conflicts and undermined confidence in politics in different countries. Politicians now seem to be more and more in favour of a foreign policy based on geopolitical arguments, protectionism and isolationism. Major military exercises, such as those conducted during the Cold War, are again being held. The domestic deployment of the armed forces seems to be increasing due to the threat of terrorism and crime. Security has become more complex: there are multiple threats and multiple state and non-state actors. Although internal and external security seem to be strongly intertwined, a (starting) shift of the focus of the armed forces (in the direction of its primary task) is becoming visible. The current complex security situation makes it safe to assume that there are no simple answers and may indicate that the future will show a combination of both points of view within international relations.

The nature of future international relations is strongly linked to the future of home affairs. It is uncertain what this future will be like. On the one hand, it can be argued that the first vision of international relations will prevail, and that international cooperation will meet the challenges regarding safety, security, prosperity, food supply and the environment. Expeditionary deployment of, for example, gendarmerie-like forces seems obvious.

On the other hand, and more closely linked to the second vision of international relations, approaches based on nationalism and protectionism can also give direction to developments in the world. Sentiments and realities with regard to the bipolar world could become visual and the chances of expeditionary justice and security operations could decrease. The deployment of gendarmeries in this setting would become less likely, while at the same time the need to deploy these forces for a domestic role could increase; especially if governments and politicians increasingly move away from their

citizens and have to emphasize the enforcement of national legislation, rules and order.

A third scenario, in which there are no simple answers, a combination of both points of view (and subsequent involvement of gendarmerie forces) is possible.

Taking the role of gendarmeries in international missions as a starting point, the experts gave the increasing complexity as an example. Whereas the forces were deployed as a buffer force or as observers during the Cold War period, their role and tasks in contemporary international missions are far more complex.

Future international police missions will show an increasing emphasis on conflict prevention, will be characterised by interconnectedness, uncertainty and ambiguity, and will be increasingly influenced by the exponential development of technologies and the use of modern techniques of communication (e.g. social media).

These future international missions call for new answers. Bringing together ministers, chiefs of police, gendarmerie and police representatives from almost two hundred countries in June 2018, the Second UN Chiefs of Police Summit expressed the commitment to strengthen the ability to effectively prevent and address security threats before they transcend borders.<sup>11</sup> The future and already indicated shift in emphasis can also be found in a contribution by Caparini, who argues that (UN) police can play a critical role in conflict prevention through:

*“... (a) direct operational actions aimed at mediating and defusing tensions and deterring violence; (b) structural prevention linked to capacity-building activities of mentoring, training and advising host state police, as well as supporting the development of more effective, accountable and legitimate law enforcement institutions; and (c) systemic prevention through support for international and regional norms and mechanisms to combat transnational organized crime, illicit arms flows and human trafficking”.*<sup>12</sup>

<sup>11</sup> <https://police.un.org/en/UNCOPS2018>

<sup>12</sup> Marina Caparini (2018), *UN Police and Conflict Prevention*, SIPRI discussion paper, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

## Armed forces and police: simply a matter of division of labour

In 2002, a report was published in the Netherlands by Stichting Maatschappij Veiligheid en Politie - the Foundation for Society, Security and Police - in which the future relationship between the armed forces and police was outlined.<sup>13</sup> Taking cooperation between the two 'legal bearers of arms' as a starting point, four possible future scenarios were described. One of them is the merger of the two organisations into one single security organisation. History shows that this scenario is not as new as it looks at first glance.

During the Middle Ages and the Early Modern Time the focus was on the own family, the own tribe and the city. Much later - modern times - the focus shifted to the population in the nation state. The population was protected against external threats by the warriors of the tribe, kings and nobles in exchange for a restriction of individual autonomy and the payment of taxes.<sup>14</sup> In the same period, kings and princes left the cities free to govern themselves and to maintain their own internal security and local standards, as long as there was no threat to their authority. Locally recruited men, who often worked on a part-time, often unpaid basis as city guards, night guards or enforcers, can be regarded as the forerunners of today's police. Likewise, the citizens who - paid by the victim - arrested criminals were forerunners of the penal system who together with the city guards enforced public order, supervised by the sheriff or the towns' dignitaries.<sup>15</sup>

With the dawning of the period of industrialisation and the emergence of nation states, the protection of state sovereignty and prosperity became more and more important. In the beginning of the 19th century, strongly influenced by Napoleon,<sup>16</sup> the state emerged as the protector of the territory (external

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<sup>13</sup> Stichting Maatschappij Veiligheid en Politie (2002), *Politie en krijgsmacht: Hun verhouding in de toekomst* (Police and armed forces: Their future relationship), SMVP, Dordrecht.

<sup>14</sup> See a.o. René Moelker, Florian Huiskamp and Sjo Soeters: 'Staatsvorming en Krijgsmacht', in *Krijgsmacht en samenleving* (Formation of state and armed forces, in Armed Forces and Society), Amsterdam, Boom, 15-43.

<sup>15</sup> See a.o. Clive Emsley (2009), 'History', in Alison Wakefield and Jenny Fleming, *The Sage Dictionary of Policing*, London, Sage Publications, 140-141. David H. Bayley (1985), *Patterns of policing: a comparative international analysis*, New Brunswick, Rutgers University Press.

<sup>16</sup> The emergence of the nation state is situated earlier in the cases of France (1536) and the United Kingdom (1707). Many French governmental innovations were often copied by

security by military power) and as guardian of law and order (internal security by the police) and thus created a division of labour between the armed forces and the police, which led to separate specialised professions.<sup>17</sup>

With regard to the post-industrial period we are living in, Moelker argues that - due to globalisation, new (hybrid) security threats and the emerging security industry, in which not only state actors, but also outsourced companies, citizen vigilantes, etc. play a role - the division between armed forces and police forces is again becoming more blurred.<sup>18</sup> At the same time, he underlined the need for good governance as a basis for security. However, this security is hindered by the fact that although crime rates are dropping the general feeling of insecurity (security paradox) remains.

Police and armed forces share a long history and both are uniformed government services that have the mandatory power to use legal force and contribute to state authority.<sup>19</sup> Combined, they represent the state's strong arm.

Pointing to present and upcoming security threats in both the national and the international domain, several authors indicate that the security agenda is becoming increasingly hybrid, encompassing internal, external, military, criminal and civil threats.<sup>20</sup> The special attention that is requested for bridging

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emerging nation states during Napoleon's reign in large parts of the European continent. The related division of labour between police forces and armed forces was very gradual and thus the start of the 18th century is not accurate to the exact date, but it is accurate as a point of time in general.

<sup>17</sup> Presentation René Moelker at the FIEP seminar held in Amsterdam on 19 February 2019.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> See a.o. D.H. Bayley (1985); D.H. Bayley and C.D. Shearing (2001). *The New Structure of Policing: Description, Conceptualization and Research Agenda*. Washington DC: National Institute of Justice.

<sup>20</sup> See a.o. B. Bowling and T. Newburn, (2006). *Policing and National Security*. Presented at London Colombia Police, Community and Rule of Law' workshop, London, 16-17 March; Hans Geser (1996). 'Internationale Polizeiaktionen: Ein neues evolutionäres Entwicklungsstadium militärischer Organisationen?' In Georg-Maria Meyer (Hrsg.), *Friedensengel im Kampfanzug?* Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag: 45-74; K.W. Haltiner, (2003). 'Erfordern neue Militäraufgaben neue Militärstrukturen? Organisationssoziologische Betrachtungen zur Verpolizeilichung des Militärs', In: S. Collmer, *Krieg, Konflikt und Gesellschaft*. Hamburg: Aktuelle interdisziplinäre Perspektiven: 159-186.



the so-called 'security gap' during international crisis management operations is highly relevant to gendarmeries.<sup>21</sup> In theory there are three options to address the emerging hybrid and complex situation:<sup>22</sup> (1) preserving the existing difference between the police and the military; (2) more and more intensive cooperation between the two; and (3) the merging of the police and the military into one single hybrid security organisation (modelled after gendarmerie-like forces<sup>23</sup>).

Admitting that the options to address the hybrid security situation is highly dependent on the respective national police systems and how the military is tasked and structured, mainstream academic discourse points to the blurring divide between armed forces and police. This blurring can indicate the extent to which the police and armed forces converge. Many authors point out two (related) processes that occur almost simultaneously: the process of the militarisation of the police and the constabularisation of the armed forces.

Kraska defines the militarisation of the police as a process in which the civil police increasingly makes use of military values, procedures, techniques and resources in the execution of its tasks or in organising itself along the lines of a military organisation.<sup>23</sup> He also notes that militarisation is based on the ideology of militarism. By this, he understands 'a series of beliefs, values and assumptions that emphasize the use of force and the threat of violence as the most suitable and effective way to solve problems'.<sup>24</sup> Looking at the organisational, operational, material and cultural dimensions of the police, it is important to be able to recognise to what extent these are oriented towards the application of coercion and violence in the higher parts of the spectrum of violence.

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<sup>21</sup> See a.o. D.T. Armitage, and A.M. Moisan. (2005) 'Constabulary Forces and Postconflict Transition: The Euro-Atlantic Dimension'. In: *Strategic Forum*, No. 218, pp. 1-8. Available at: <http://www.ndu.edu>; R.B. Oakley and M.J. Dziedzic (1998), 'Conclusions'. In R.B. Oakley, M.J. Dziedzic and E.M. Goldberg (Eds.), *Policing the New World Order: Peace Operations and Public Security*: Washington DC: National Defense University Press: 509-535; R.M. Perito, (2004). *Where is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him? America's Search for a Postconflict Stability Force*. Washington DC: United Institute of Peace Press.

<sup>22</sup> See also M. Easton and R. Moelker (2010), 'Police and Military: two worlds apart? Current Challenges in the Process of Constabularisation of the Armed Forces and Militarisation of the Civilian Police', in M. Easton M. den Boer, J. Janssens, R. Moelker & T. Van der Beken (Eds.), *Blurring Military and Police Roles*. Den Haag, Boom Uitgevers 2010, 11-32.

<sup>23</sup> Peter Kraska (2007), 'Militarization and Policing: Its Relevance to 21st Century Police', *Policing* (1) 2007, nr. 4, 501-513.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

The concept of constabularisation is less easy to define. The literature offers no single and clear definition.<sup>25</sup> What the definitions that are given have in common is that they often refer to the execution of police tasks by military personnel during crisis management operations.<sup>26</sup> Other definitions include the adaptive changes in the organisation and operational concepts.<sup>27</sup> In this publication, constabularisation is defined as the extent to which the armed forces model their organisation and operational concept on those of the police organisation in order to effectively contribute to the restoration of public order and security during an international crisis management operation.

If our observations are correct and both processes where police and armed forces are converging into one single (hybrid) security organisation are ongoing, this raises questions about the existence of gendarmerie-like forces in the long-term.

Some final remarks have to be made on the security gap and the possible role of gendarmerie-like forces. Quite a number of authors consider the gendarmerie organisation an ideal mix between the military and the police and therefore a viable solution to a security gap.<sup>28</sup> Thanks to their unique character that combines their 'military DNA' with their inherent policing skills and their capability to police among the population in less benign situations,

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<sup>25</sup> P.C.J Neuteboom (2010), 'Constabulary Force: A Viable Solution to the Security Gap? An Analysis of Different Models', in: M. Easton et al (Eds.), *Blurring Military and Police Roles*. Den Haag, Boom Uitgevers, 129-150; M. Easton and R. Moelker (2010); M. de Weger (2010), 'Striving for symmetry: Constabularisation, security and security complexes', in M. Easton et al (eds) *Blurring Military and Police Roles*, 111-126.

<sup>26</sup> Hans Geser (1996); K.W. Haltiner (2003); M. Kaldor (2006), *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*. Cambridge, Polity Press.

<sup>27</sup> In a case study in the Netherland, Neuteboom and Hovens concluded that although the Dutch military performed police tasks in international missions and assisted the Dutch police in the Netherland, this did not lead to a substantial change in the armed forces nor the police (P. Neuteboom and H. Hovens (2018), 'Hybridiseren van de zwaarmachten: realiteit of fictie?' In: *Krijgsmacht en politietaken*, Justitiële verkenningen, Research and Documentation Centre of the Dutch Ministry of Security and Justice and Boom Juridical Publishers, no. 3, 39-58.

<sup>28</sup> See a.o. D.T. Armitage, and A.M. Moisan. (2005) ; R.M. Perito, (2004); H. Hovens (2011), 'The European Gendarmerie Force: Bridging the Public Security Gap?' in Hovens, J.L. & Elk, G.A.G. van (Eds.). *Gendarmeries and the Security Challenges of 21st Century*. The Hague-Koninklijke Marechaussee, 139-165; H. Hovens (2017), 201-216.

gendarmerie-like forces seem to be the logical first responders with regard to international military missions with policing tasks. The deployment of gendarmeries to missions in the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan is often regarded as 'successful'. Neuteboom states that despite the perfect fit and general success, gendarmeries do not provide a universal or long-term solution to security gaps.<sup>29</sup> His statement is based on three arguments: (1) the number of available gendarmes is limited, because a relative small number of countries have forces historically rooted in the gendarmerie tradition and because these forces are commonly an integrated and indispensable part of the national police system; (2) a gendarmerie in a constabulary role can only be considered supplementary to the existing international security capability. They cannot replace military forces or a civilian police force; they can only support them; and (3) the presence of a gendarmerie as a third force, between the military and the police, might cause (or worsen) institutional coordination problems.

Laying claim to an exclusive role in bridging the security gap is at odds with the abovementioned arguments.

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<sup>29</sup> P.C.J Neuteboom (2010).

### 3. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY: DRIVER FOR CHANGE

The focus of the expert meeting held in April 2019 was the growing interconnectedness between people and organisations in the physical world and the latest developments in information and communication technology (ICT or IT, which is also considered the main driver for change) that can be connected to the virtual world. The omnipresence of advanced technology and its applications influences policing in many ways: in the national context, the international context and the transnational context. Participants were asked to elaborate on the availability and effective use of such technology in policing and future international missions of gendarmerie-like forces.

A first step in the joint venture of the experts concerned the nature and scope of the new technologies and, in particular, that of computerisation. In a second step, the experts elaborated on the impact of these developments on policing.<sup>30</sup> Subsequently, they examined the impact on crime and criminal behaviour, the effect on police public relations, and the impact on police effectiveness and efficiency. Recognising the mutual differences in knowledge and experience in this field, the experts expressed their keen interest in becoming and remaining engaged in further work. The participants agreed to share - to the extent that (inter-)national security interests do not dictate otherwise- general knowledge and expertise on computer technology in general, on cybercrime and cyber security, and on notions of security, including human rights safeguards (e.g. privacy and due process).

#### **New technologies: a faster, more connected, but also more ambiguous world**

The rate of innovation in IT is unprecedented. The speed with which ever larger amounts of information can be linked to each other grew exponentially, and more and more parts of our personal lives are becoming connected

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<sup>30</sup> A similar approach was followed by INTERPOL and the UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI): in June 2019 they organised a global meeting in Singapore, where experts and participants discussed the opportunities and risks of artificial intelligence and robotics for law enforcement. See: INTERPOL/UNICRI (2019), *Artificial Intelligence and Robotics for Law Enforcement*, Torino, Italy.

through ‘smart devices’. While many now use Google (launched in 1997), the first search engine was launched in 1990: Archie.<sup>31</sup> Essentially, Archie became a database of web filenames which it would match with the users queries, whereas Google Search is based on algorithms not only linking users to cached versions of websites, but also enabling them to see files such as PDFs, Word documents, spreadsheets, presentations, certain multimedia content and plain text.

Simultaneously with the development described above, the emergence of the first social media services in the early 1990s increased the interconnectedness between people enormously and, subsequently, all forms of electronic communication have taken an important place in the range of means of communication. ‘Social media’ (e.g. Facebook, WhatsApp, Instagram, Twitter, Snapchat) include “all kinds of electronic communication (such as websites for social networking and microblogging) through which users create online communities for sharing information, ideas, personal messages, and other content (such as videos)”.<sup>32</sup>

In the film *Minority Report*, the Chief Commissioner John Alderton gains access to restricted areas through an iris scan,<sup>33</sup> these scans have now become reality (as have image, fingerprint and face recognition). Recent years also showed the emergence of devices, embedded with electronics, internet connectivity, and other forms of hardware (such as sensors) that enable us to remotely monitor and control our houses from our smartphones, perform complicated healthcare operations with the help of real-life sensors and robots at great distances, and access vehicle navigation or autonomous cars in our streets.

The ever-lengthening leap of computer technology has also led to an exponential growth of stored data among consumers (photos, films and other files), organisations, governments and companies, as well as data that devices themselves collect, store and exchange. Therefore, not only the storage of these data, but also the analysis thereof is a challenge. The data sets are too large to be maintained with regular database management systems.

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<sup>31</sup> See a.o. <http://www.searchenginehistory.com/>

<sup>32</sup> <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/social%20media>

<sup>33</sup> Steven Spielberg’s science fiction film *Minority Report* was released in 2002. Tom Cruise played John Alderton.

The internet can be divided into three levels, often described as an iceberg: (1) the top of the iceberg is the visual part of internet; most common are social media<sup>34</sup> and public information accessible through browsers: (2) just underneath the surface, one can find the deep web. It is the space where one has restricted access to data. Data are protected by passwords and against viruses. Data are only accessible for those who are eligible and have passwords; (3) finally, the dark web. The content exists on darknets, overlay networks which use the public internet, but which require specific software, configurations or authorisation to access. The dark web is not indexed by search engines, and include small, friend-to-friend/peer-to-peer networks, as well as large, popular networks operated by public organisations and individuals. The dark web is often used by criminal networks and hackers as well as whistle-blowers (WIKILEAKS).

The challenges and opportunities of the applications based on Web 2.0, the development of Web 3.0 and the introduction of the quantum computer are enormous.<sup>35</sup> Besides the blessings of the new technologies (who could have thought of ordering and paying for the latest book on cybercrime with your smartphone ten years ago?), together with these technologies vulnerabilities and threats arise. Challenges vary in nature from activism, hacktivism<sup>36</sup> and subversion, to social engineering,<sup>37</sup> crimes and terrorism to cyber warfare on one hand, and new forms of community policing, collecting and analysing big data for information and - more in general – the relationship with the public in a mix of traditional and social media on the other hand. Errors in the algorithms (who is not surprised about the many updates for the applications

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<sup>34</sup> Social media are defined as: a group of internet-based applications that build on the ideological and technological foundations of Web 2.0, and that allow the creation and exchange of User Generated Content (and by doing this sharing information, ideas, personal messages, and other content). (see Andreas M. Kaplan, Michael Haenlein (2010), 'Users of the world, unite! The challenges and opportunities of Social Media', in *Business Horizons* (2010) 53, 59—68)

<sup>35</sup> While Web 1.0 is often referred to as the web of documents and Web 2.0 as the internet allowing interaction with users, with Web 3.0 the internet applications are more aligned, merged or integrated.

<sup>36</sup> Hacktivism is defined as: the act of misusing a computer system or network for a socially or politically motivated reason.

<sup>37</sup> Defined as: the psychological manipulation of people into performing actions or divulging confidential information.

we use?), deception, fake news and the assumption of false identities have become reality and point to renewed attention for internet security and extra vigilance about the accuracy of messages on the internet. The blessings, vulnerabilities and challenges have, or should have, consequences for police forces and armed forces and their individual members. Hybrid warfare, making the things we see more ambiguous, cybercrime and cyber warfare demand an appropriate and adequate answer.<sup>38</sup>

## Cyber: evolution of crime?

In this section, the question is raised regarding how and to what degree ICT influences crime and criminal behaviour. After all, clarity in the answer to this is conditional for an appropriate approach from the police and gendarmerie-like forces involved in crime control.

It is undeniable that the enormous expansion in ICT has changed the way we communicate with each other, how we work and spend our free time, consume and the way we interact with others in social, political, economic and cultural life. At the same time, the internet connectivity that surrounds us has made it possible to increase the volume and pace of criminal activities, because criminals no longer need to be physically present when committing a crime. The speed, convenience, anonymity and lack of borders of the internet make it easier to commit crimes. There is therefore no doubt that the developments in cyber space have made an impact on crime and criminal behaviour.

Computer crime, or cybercrime can be distinguished in two closely related criminal activities: cyber-dependent and cyber-enabled crimes.<sup>39</sup> The British

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<sup>38</sup> See a.o. Janet Chan, (2001), *E-policing: The Impact of Information Technology on Police Practices*, Criminal Justice Commission, Queensland, Australia; Paul Ducheine, (2018). *Veiligheid en cyberspace: Veiligheid tegen (w)elke prijs?* BLIND: Interdisciplinair Tijdschrift, 49; Marc Goodman, (2016) *Future Crimes: Inside the digital underground and the battle for our connected world*, Transworld Publishers, London; Michael Robinson et al (2018) 'An introduction to cyber peacekeeping' in *Journal of Network and Computer Applications*, Volume 114, 15 July 2018, 70-87; David S. Wall, (2007/10) 'Policing Cybercrimes: Situating the Public Police in Networks of Security within Cyberspace' (Revised May 2010), *Police Practice & Research: An International Journal*, 8(2):183-205.

<sup>39</sup> See a.o. Mike McGuire and Samantha Dowling (2013) *Cyber crime: A review of the evidence, Research Report 75, Summary of key findings and implications*, UK Home Office Science, October 2013.

Home Office defines cyber-dependent crimes as crimes that can only be committed by the use of computers, computer networks, or other forms of ICT, whereas cyber-enabled crimes are traditional crimes that are increased in their scale or reach by the use of computers, computer networks or other ICT.<sup>40</sup> Examples of cyber-enabled crimes or threats are fraud (online banking, e-commerce fraud, ‘phishing’ e-mails and other scams), theft (including personal information and identification-related data), illegal arms trade, illegal drugs trade, sexual offences against children, anonymously assigned contract killers, spying, stalking, and analysing social media posts to plan or initiate or fuel illegal acts or acts against public safety. Cases of cyber-dependent crimes are the spread of viruses and other malicious software, hacking, and distributed denial of service (DDoS). A somewhat grey area between cyber-dependent and cyber-enabled crime concerns the blackmailing of people and / or organisations by threatening attacks on their vital ICT.

### **Policing and computer technologies**

Twice at the end of April and in early May 2019, the Dutch police, in cooperation with the German and American police and the respective public ministries, managed to inflict a sensitive blow on illegal internet trade. First, after intensive and lengthy investigation, the *Wall Street Market*, operating in the dark web, was seized by the authorities and the suspects were arrested. The website offered drugs among other things, but also services related to computer crime, such as hostage software (ransomware).<sup>41</sup>

A few weeks later, the police rounded up the largest coffee shop on the dark web. *At DutchMagic*, customers ordered soft drugs worth millions of euros per year. During house searches, the police seized firearms, vehicles and half a million euros in cash and gold bars.<sup>42</sup>

Early in 2009, Memphis was as ranked one of the most dangerous cities in the United States.<sup>43</sup> Crime there was higher than expected on the basis

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<sup>40</sup> Ibid. p 5.

<sup>41</sup> <https://www.politie.nl/nieuws/2019/mei/>

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

<sup>43</sup> Zack O'Malley Greenburg (2009), ‘America’s Most Dangerous Cities’ in *Forbes Magazine*, April 23, 2009.



of demographic data. Police and scientists from the University of Memphis jointly looked for opportunities to discover patterns in local crime through gaining access to and examining crime data, such as geographical hot spots on the map and times when the odds are greatest that crime flares up.

IBM's SPSS statistical programme for the project renamed Operation Blue C.R.U.S.H. (Criminal Reduction Utilizing Statistical History) enabled police and scientists to open up a huge amount of data and translate findings into concrete actions. By using detailed crime data collected by the police, the occurrence of crime could ultimately be predicted and prevented. Crime maps and data analyses are now directly integrated with police planning around problem areas, the allocation of patrols and special units and strategic planning for city-wide crime reduction.<sup>44</sup>

Two other examples concern social media: during his presentation, American agent Domizio recounted an incident in which a man was suspected of attempting to kidnap a child. After his face and name were posted on social media by the police, the man turned himself in to the police and told them that now his face and name were known everywhere, he no longer had anywhere to go. In another case, in which a 10-year-old girl was kidnapped and the only evidence was a description of a suspicious vehicle, a post on social media led to success. A man in Germany who studied vehicles saw the post and sent a 45-page PDF file about vehicles that resembled the description the police had received, ultimately leading to the arrest of a suspect. "He helped from halfway around the world, and he did it because someone shared that story with him, and he himself had a 10-year-old daughter," Domizio explained later.<sup>45</sup>

The examples described above take place at the interface between the police and ICT. Where the first example shows how the investigation into the deepest depths of the internet (and in combination with investigations and actions in the physical world) can lead to the round-up of large criminal organisations, the analysis of big data (whether or not in combination with open source investigation) in the second example points to the possibilities of a predictive

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<sup>44</sup> Walter L. Perry et al (2013), *Predictive Policing: The Role of Crime Forecasting in Law Enforcement Operations*, RAND Cooperation, 67-68.

<sup>45</sup> <https://www.policeone.com/social-media-for-cops/articles/>

policing and crime-prevention process. The last example shows one of the ways in which the police can make use of social media.

The examples show the significance of ICT for the police and the safety of society. In addition to the many blessings that the new technologies bring, these technologies also show where vulnerabilities and threats lie. More than ever, the police are able to quickly analyse large amounts of – open source or not – data in order to give direction to police action (intelligence-led policing) or to solve or even prevent crimes. At the same time, the increased interconnectedness and the role of social media create new demands with regard to relations between the police and citizens. In addition to posting posts to involve a large audience in the solution of a case, policing social media can provide real-life information, enabling police to put an end to unwanted situations in a timely manner. An active use of social media can also help increase trust in the police. The new technologies also place new demands on caution, accountability and the protection of privacy and other fundamental rights of individuals. At the same time, but more internally focussed on the police, the importance of the security of the police station, the police operation and police officers demands additional internal regulations on the use of ICT in general and social media in particular. Consider, for example, the possibilities of discovering patterns by means of GPS tracking that can make police officers a vulnerable target.

Coming to the end of this section, the possibilities of new technology have to be put into a certain perspective. This relativization is based on the fact that from the outset police work has been based on gathering and analysing information. The volume and speed of information-processing has increased enormously with the rise of new technologies. This allowed a broadening in the purpose of information-gathering and analysis, from the traditional "catching criminals" through optimising the use of available police capacity to preventing crime. Finally, the use of technology by the police is (partly) related to the extent to which the population has access to ICT and is also a question of the financial resources available to the police and the application of the principles of good policing as described above.

### **On the blurring divide between real world and virtual world**

Experts from the gendarmerie-like forces associated in FIEP focused on the challenges and opportunities of ICT for policing. Two aspects were addressed:

(1) how to police in this new context? (2) is there a need to regulate the use of social media by the members of gendarmerie-like forces being on-duty or off-duty? And, if so, what can be recommended?

During the meeting, in Rome, of ICT experts and representatives from the office of public affairs, these experts discussed public-police relations through the use of ICT in general and social media in particular in order to prevent public disorder, protests, rebellion or internal destabilisation, to maintain public order and security, provide help to the citizens, and prevent and detect crime while upholding and respecting the standards for 'good policing'. The experts also discussed searching, gathering and analysing information and processing big data (mainly open source) and talked about questions such as "who or what is the target we are looking for and how can we find it?"<sup>46</sup>

Furthermore, the experts elaborated on the possible role of social media in regard to building the public's trust in the police on one hand and security on the other hand. They could agree to advertising the results of police efforts, but were very reluctant or unwilling to share information on the way that those results were achieved.

Finally, the experts discussed the resources necessary to work with ICT and emphasised the availability of those new technologies, the presence of skilled personnel and sufficient financial resources.

Three observations can be made regarding the differences between the FIEP association's gendarmerie-like forces: (1) the availability of new technology and how to work with it; (2) the difference in focus with regard to one's own website and the use of social media (varying from an extension of the 'traditional public relations office' to means that can also be used to maintain public order and to control crime<sup>47</sup>); (3) the difference in attention for the protection of own staff and processes in the new ICT environment.

A final observation concerns the limited attention that seemed to be present for the role that ICT has or can have for future international missions for gendarmerie-like forces. Considering the role that social media play or can

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<sup>46</sup> Actually, a question of how to make appropriate algorithms to find what we might be looking for?

<sup>47</sup> Most likely partly caused by a certain 'mismatch' between the subject and the selection of the representing experts.

play in strengthening public-police relations and trust in the police, as well as recognising potential spoilers of peace, attention to social media within the gendarmeries would be more than appropriate. Moreover, it could be argued that – if cyber warfare increasingly becomes part of wider conflict – organisations such as the United Nations will find it necessary to carry out an activity akin to ‘cyber peacekeeping’. Here again, gendarmerie-like forces could raise the question of whether or not to get involved in this process.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> Michael Robinson et al (2018) ‘An Introduction to Cyber Peacekeeping’ in *Journal of Network and Computer Applications*, April 2018, 1-21.



# **PART TWO**

## **POSSIBLE ANSWERS TO THE FUTURE**

*“The greatest danger in times of turbulence is not the turbulence;  
it is to act with yesterday's logic.”*

*(Peter Drucker)*

## 4. GRASPING THE FUTURE AND DEALING WITH IT

Many trends and the characteristics of the changing world came across in the first part and influence the future to a great extent. The trends and characteristics of change are not only significant for the way in which gendarmeries respond to specific security threats but can also affect the organisational form and working methods within them.

In this chapter the response(s) on the security threats, the possible effects on the gendarmerie-like forces as such (form, working methods, etc.), 'safeguards' and resilience and will be described subsequently.

### **Future operations and (international) missions**

Threats or challenges to security are, in terms of their spatial dimension or their intensity, neither purely internal nor purely external in nature.<sup>49</sup> Examples are an influx of streams of refugees and related irregular migration, international terrorism and transnational organised crime.

The asymmetric threat with a higher level of violence from opponents; the growing importance -and scale- of peace operations, as well as the rise of more and more joint operations in which military and civil organisations work together; security and public order problems rising in the aftermath floods or natural disasters; and the growing importance of moral and ethical standards.

At the same time hybrid threats and geopolitically driven (rising) tensions might give reason to prepare for (more) large-scale conflicts.

And, finally, governments seem to be losing contact with their citizens.<sup>50</sup> A growing number of citizens is experiencing a gap between their needs for a predictable public security, their expected right to share in prosperity and their inalienable right to a personal identity and the 'quick fix', rather 'simple' solutions of the politicians. Unless the political leadership succeeds to take back 'control', social unrest en subsequent public order problems might occur.

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<sup>49</sup> H. Hovens (2017).

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

Considering these new security challenges, a more ‘robust’ response than the police usually provides seems to be necessary. The call for more robust policing has led to a certain level of militarisation of the police. As Lutterbeck and De Weger point out, the number of gendarmes and the scope of their involvement in national and international security matters has increased over the past three decades and will -most probably- continue to do so.<sup>51</sup>

The trends mentioned above seem to appeal to the distinctive features of the gendarmerie-like forces. Characteristics that, on the one hand, enable these forces to police in less benign, less stable or less secure environments and which, on the other hand, enable these gendarmeries to be a linking pin between the worlds of military and civilian (police) organisations.

Despite the 'perfect match' with the demand for more robust policing and the previously mentioned growth of the forces, the pressure on these organisations has increased substantially under the influence of the many security threats (national, international and transnational) on the one hand and possible demilitarisation of the internal security, budgetary constraints and limited resources on the other.<sup>52</sup>

Looking more closely to the effects of the possible future on the daily routines of gendarmes, three ‘mainstreams’ can be distinguished in all elaborations during the Dutch Presidency: the dominant worldview, the organisational responses and/or recognised needs; and the desired or necessary safeguards within the deployment in future international missions.

#### *Dominant view on the world*

The first main theme refers to the questions of what the current situation is and what will happen in the future. It is noteworthy that a substantial number of all contributions to the project projected the horizon for the

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<sup>51</sup> D. Lutterbeck (2013), *The Paradox of Gendarmeries - Between Expansion, Demilitarization and Dissolution*. DCAF, SSR Paper 8; M. de Weger (2008) 'The Rise of the Gendarmes? What really happened in Holland. Connection, *The Quarterly Journal*, volume VIII, number 1, Winter 2008, 92-114. Weger, M.de (2009).

<sup>52</sup> See note 4.



future close to today.<sup>53</sup> Therefore, the question seems justified as to whether these contributions are referring to the next international mission rather than future international missions. A substantial part of the input builds on the further development of ideas that were set in motion some time ago. At first glance, the growing complexity and ambiguity in the mission area are often referred to: in a comprehensive approach, one must deal with (non-) state actors, civil and military partners, non-governmental and governmental organisations ((N)GOs), protesters, refugees, homeless people, etc. The same applies to the observation that crises, whether they are occurring in the interior or abroad, are becoming increasingly hybrid and that there is more war amongst the people<sup>54</sup> than classic wars between states (although these are not excluded either).<sup>55</sup> Also worth mentioning is the observed rise of the concept of human security,<sup>56</sup> as mentioned in the previous section. Gendarmerie-like forces can play a role in the realisation of human security

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<sup>53</sup> An exception is Pascal Wolf who – pointing to the transnationalisation of crime, terrorism and migration – argues that gendarmeries, unified in e.g. the European Gendarmerie Force (EUROGENDFOR), could give a transnational law enforcement response to the present and ever-growing challenges (Pascal Wolf, *Involving gendarmerie forces in domestic (EU) security issues: Merger of internal and external security* (Amsterdam, 2019)); Remarkable in this context is the explanation that John Casey gives to the Velsen Treaty (Treaty between the Kingdom of Spain, the French Republic, the Italian Republic, the Kingdom of The Netherlands and the Portuguese Republic establishing the European Gendarmerie Force, EUROGENDFOR, Velsen, 18 October 2007). While the preamble and Articles 1, 4 and 5 indicate a commitment within the framework of crisis management operations under the umbrella of - in particular - the EU, the OSCE, the UN and NATO, Casey, points at a report by Statewatch (European Gendarmerie Force to be launched in Italy on 19 January, [www.statewatch.org/news/2006/jan/03eu-gendarmarie](http://www.statewatch.org/news/2006/jan/03eu-gendarmarie)), mentioning the concerns in certain political and civilian circles about a possible deployment within the borders of the EU without the same “accountable requirements currently demanded of civilian policing in most European countries” (see John Casey, (2010), *Policing the World; The Practice of International Policing*, Carolina Academic Press, Durham, 162-163). The latter view is rejected within EUROGENDFOR circles.

<sup>54</sup> See a.o. Rupert Smith (2008), *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World*. Random House USA Inc.

<sup>55</sup> E.g. Alexander Bondarenko, (2019), *Experience of Ukraine as for mechanisms investigation of state governing of security forces' joint actions in crisis situations responding and the possibility of its application by gendarmeries in future international peacekeeping and security operations*, Kharkiv, Ukraine; Inès Rommel, (2019) *Resorting to Gendarmerie-type forces in international operations: a step towards success?* Paris, France.

<sup>56</sup> E.g. Domenico Tota, (2019), *Gendarmerie-like forces in future international missions: the deployment of specialised units*, Rome, Italy.

in future international missions, due to the combination of their military and police capabilities.<sup>57</sup> A final remark concerning the environment or situation in which future international missions for gendarmerie-like forces take place, must be made. Almost without exception, all contributions point directly or indirectly, and to a greater or lesser extent, to the theoretical framework of the public security gap described by Dziedzic.<sup>58</sup> Gendarmerie-like forces seize on this conceptual framework, in which situations ‘on the ground’ call for a rapidly deployable, armed and robust police component, able to perform – in close coordination with military units – all executive policing tasks in less benign situations, to point out the added value of their forces. However, a more recent study by Dziedzic focuses more on the present-day complex and often ambiguous situations in the mission area and tries to give answers to the question of how sustainable peace and security can be realised.<sup>59</sup> Taking note of Dziedzic’s recent study is in line with the USIP report on the prevention of extremism in fragile states. All in all, it seems that the experts’ contributions indicate that the rapidly changing and the more complex and ambiguous world does indeed lead to (great) uncertainty, but that the world is still ‘repairable’ if the right tools are used.

#### *Organisational responses and/or recognised needs*

This brings us to the second main theme: the organisational responses and/or recognised needs. Three different perspectives can be distinguished: the character of gendarmerie-like forces, the new areas of attention and renewed attention for existing points of interest, and the plea for further international cooperation. The latter will be discussed in the next chapter. As previously mentioned and referring to the responses to future challenges, an important part of the experts’ input to the central theme of the Dutch presidency is based on the unique character and the added value of

<sup>57</sup> Ibid.

<sup>58</sup> M.J. Dziedzic (1998), ‘Introduction’, in Robert B. Oackley, M.J. Dziedzic en E.M. Goldberg (ed.): *Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security*. National Defence University Press, Washington, DC, 8-16

<sup>59</sup> Dziedzic argues that the absence of sustainable peace and security is found in not addressing the persistent spoiler threats coming from criminalised power structures. See: Michael Dziedzic (ed.), (2016) *Criminalized Power Structures: The Overlooked Enemies of Peace*. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

gendarmerie-like forces. It refers to the key assets of gendarmeries: their ‘military DNA’ and the policing competencies developed and exercised daily on national territory,<sup>60</sup> their capability of operating – as an overlapping or intermediate third force – between the military on one side and the police on the other side;<sup>61</sup> it also refers to the adaptability of gendarmerie-like forces, their deployability and their agility.<sup>62</sup> It is surprising that the input from experts does not mention the process of ‘police-isation’ or constabularisation of the military, as well as the process of militarisation of the police.<sup>63</sup> After all, as such and as described above, both processes could close the public security gap and could thus reduce, alter or end the role of the gendarmerie.

On the basis of the experiences gained nationally and in international missions, some experts argue for a greater dissemination of knowledge about the gendarmerie concept and their added value,<sup>64</sup> while others make a case for ‘exporting’ the model to post-conflict areas in the context of strengthening missions.<sup>65</sup>

Several suggestions were made in the respective contributions. Although some authors point to challenges such as the limited number of police

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<sup>60</sup> E.g. Rommel and Antonio Bianco, (2019) *The Gendarmerie model and the protection of civilians*, Rome, Italy.

<sup>61</sup> E.g. Serhii Olexandrovykh Hodlevskiy, (2019), *The role and place of gendarmerie forces in international peace operations*, Kharkiv, Ukraine; Alejandro Espada Isaac, (2019), *Gendarmerie-like forces in future international missions*, Madrid, Spain. - not published (2019), *Gendarmerie-like forces in future international missions*, Madrid, Spain; and Diogo Araújo (2019), *Performance of the gendarmerie forces in post-conflict situations: the Guarda Nacional Republicana in Bosnia (2007-2010)*, Lisbon, Portugal.

<sup>62</sup> Wolf.

<sup>63</sup> E.g. M. de Weger (2010); Peter Neuteboom (2014), *Beyond borders: The role of the Netherlands Army in public security during crisis management operations*. Wolf Legal Publishers (WLP), Oisterwijk, Netherlands; Charles J. Dunlap (1999), *The Police-ization of the Military*. *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, Vol. 27 (Winter), 1999, 217-232; Peter B. Krazka (2007); Michael Salter (2014), ‘Toys for the Boys? Drones, Pleasure and Popular Culture in the Militarisation of Policing’, *Critical Criminology*, 22(2), 2014, 163-177.

<sup>64</sup> E.g. Rommel.

<sup>65</sup> E.g. Bianco, Bondarenko, and Maurizio Pandolfi, (2019) *Gendarmerie-like forces in future international missions*, Rome, Italy.

personnel or gendarmes available, financial constraints, and political will,<sup>66</sup> it is eye-catching that other authors argue that the scope of the deployment of gendarmerie-like forces should be broadened. In that context, authors point to the deployment of gendarmerie forces in the pre-conflict phase in failing states and during pandemic or disaster situations (such as the deadly Ebola outbreak in Liberia in 2014, the massive earthquake in early 2010 and the devastating hurricane in 2016, both in Haiti) and to restore or maintain public order and security along with the indigenous police.<sup>67</sup> One author worth mentioning is Wolf who – acknowledging the necessity of the involvement of the military in national security matters – argues that the characteristics of gendarmeries and gendarmerie-like forces make them very suitable for a transnational role in (EU) domestic affairs.<sup>68</sup> He suggests that a pool of international gendarmerie units (such as EUROGENDFOR) would be most helpful to address long-standing security threats in member states as an addition to their national security forces.

Finally, three authors describe a number of issues that demand (renewed) attention: Bondarenko suggests considering working with situation centres, which control the deployment of security forces in the overlapping and sometimes successive phases that can be distinguished in international

crisis management operations.<sup>69</sup> Pandolfi suggests the introduction or further use of intelligence-led policing, a policing strategy that is built around the gathering of huge amounts of information, the assessment of this information and the management of risk. Special attention for this strategy could help to build a good relationship with citizens in the mission area, he argues.<sup>70</sup> Finally, Morozov calls for renewed attention for the logistic support of gendarmerie forces that will be taking part in future international missions.<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> E.g. Mohammad Khaled Almrmaidat (2019), *The significance of Gendarmerie like forces in future international missions*, Amman, Jordan; Cristian Gonzalez Araneda, (2019), *The future challenges for new structures of police forces in a UN peacekeeping mission*, Santiago, Chile.

<sup>67</sup> E.g. Bianco, Espada Isaac, Almrmaidat and Tota.

<sup>68</sup> Wolf.

<sup>69</sup> Bondarenko.

<sup>70</sup> Padolfi.

<sup>71</sup> Ihor Morozov, (2019), *Logistic support of the gendarmerie forces in future international police operations in peacekeeping and security missions*, Kharkiv, Ukraine.

### *Desired or necessary safeguards*

From an emerging focus on human security, and trying to increase resilience, contributions, made by experts during the seminar in February 2019, pay special attention to the principles of good governance, ‘good policing’ and the question of primacy.<sup>72</sup> Good (democratic) governance and ‘good policing’ is fundamental in the daily practice of policing – both nationally and internationally – because police operates so close to citizens and is seen as the true representatives of (local) government. Two factors are equally important here: the values on which a police unit operates, as well as the practices it follows.<sup>73</sup> In this respect, the principles of good governance and good policing, as well as the concept of democratic policing, are often mentioned. The Council of Europe gives twelve principles. The principles most relevant to policing are: responsiveness, professionalism, efficiency and effectiveness, innovation and openness to change, impartiality and acting in accordance with the law, openness and transparency, fairness, human rights, cultural diversity and social cohesion, ethical conduct and accountability.<sup>74</sup> Referring to police responding to the needs of both the public and the government, Bayley specified his definition of ‘democratic police’ by providing four norms:<sup>75</sup>

- police must give top operational priority to servicing the needs of individual citizens and private groups;
- police must be accountable to the law rather than to the government;
- police must protect human rights, especially those that are required for the sort of unfettered political activity that is the hallmark of democracy;
- police should be transparent in their activities.

Others describe democratic policing by pointing out three main principles: the principle of representation, that of responsiveness, and the principle of accountability.<sup>76</sup> A requirement of the principle of representation is that the police sufficiently represent the community they serve. Another

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<sup>72</sup> E.g. Tota, Bondarenko, and Wolf.

<sup>73</sup> U.S. Department of Justice, Community Relations Service, 2003, *Principles of Good Policing: Avoiding Violence Between Police and Citizens*, p. V.

<sup>74</sup> Council of Europe, *Strategy on Innovation and Good Governance at local level* (2008).

<sup>75</sup> David H. Bayley (2001), *Democratizing the Police Abroad: What to do and How to Do It*. National Institute of Justice, US Department of Justice, Washington, 13-14.

<sup>76</sup> E.g. *the Handbook on UN Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations, 2003*; and OSCE Guidebook on Democratic Policing, 2006.

requirement concerns the adequate representation of minority groups and women in the police service. The principle of responsiveness refers to the way the police respond to public needs and expectations (especially crime prevention and detection and the upholding of public order). This principle encompasses the service orientation of the police. The principle of accountability has three different dimensions: a legal, political and economic dimension. Legally, the police are accountable to the law, as are all other individuals and institutions. Politically, the police are held accountable through democratic and political institutions, as well as through police and citizen liaison groups. The police are also economically accountable for how they use the resources that have been allocated to them.

Closely connected to the foregoing is the primacy of security matters. While some authors link the establishment of police primacy with a military exit strategy,<sup>77</sup> and connect it with activities such as the training and rebuilding of indigenous police forces, the question of primacy also refers to who is responsible or bears responsibility for internal security if this security is or might be endangered by opposing groups, insurgents, criminal organisations, or terrorists; this is particularly pertinent if these factions employ a great deal of violence. The contribution of Bondarenko touches on the question of primacy and the position and role of gendarmerie-like forces in the different stadia of (internal) conflict.<sup>78</sup>

### **Organisational impact of future trends for gendarmerie-like forces**

Taking the foregoing possible trends for the future as the starting point, experts turned to the question of what these trends mean for their organisations as such and the working processes within them.

The experts consulted acknowledge that being adaptive and flexible to the new challenges is of the utmost importance. Adaptivity and flexibility are important at both the strategic and tactical (or even individual) levels. What is needed is a general attitude to adapt, as well as the ability to be flexible and to act accordingly.

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<sup>77</sup> E.g. Matthew R. Modarelli (2008), *Military Police Operations and Counterinsurgency*, *Small Wars Journals*, retrieved from <http://smallwarsjournal.com> on 18 September 2011.

<sup>78</sup> Bondarenko.

In order to become or stay adaptive and flexible, the experts argued that a clear vision on the future and the future of their respective gendarmerie-like forces, as well as a good understanding of current and future developments are of the utmost importance.

The answers to the questions of how the respective forces could react to future challenges differ. While some experts emphasise what must be changed within the organisation itself in order to face future challenges and become more adaptive, others underline the importance of developing organisational and practical options in order to be prepared for and cope with future challenges. A generally shared idea amongst the experts is that gendarmerie-like forces will have to be prepared to do more with less.

Whereas the first group of experts mentions structural changes in the organisation and creating working methods and procedures to achieve a more adaptive and flexible organisation, the second group of experts points to the necessity of a comprehensive interagency approach, the need to search for more cooperation with other actors to counter broader security problems, the possible need to reallocate their resources (in favour of national interests) and to enhance their ability to better understand the needs and desires of the world around them (improving situational awareness through establishing good or better relations with the citizens and other relevant actors in society).

#### *Bridging present-day and future challenges*

The experts unanimously underlined that bridging the contemporary and future challenges can only be done by people. The subsequent question is: what kind of people are needed? And in line with this: how can people become highly adaptive and innovative?

The experts argued that the challenges can only be countered by a strategy that addresses recruitment and selection, training and education and the organisational culture. Change is the only constant factor. Apart from the use of potential selection criteria for adaptivity and innovation, a new kind of training and education within which the use of intuition, empathy, logic, science and technology is taught must be considered. Think tanks could be organised in order to understand the changes and develop appropriate answers to these changes, either to adapt the organisational structure or its repertoire of action. A culture must be created in which asking the

question becomes more important than having the concrete answer and in which making mistakes is permissible as long as lessons can be drawn from them.

Questions that remained open in this respect concern the role of leadership and (organisational) vision.

Other issues raised by the experts deal with an expansion of the possibilities to be able to respond earlier, faster and more adequately to changes in the environment of gendarmerie-like organisations. Possible measures such as a better understanding of and larger investments in new technologies, a better use of (social) media, the enlargement of the networks (EU, companies, etc.) of the forces, as well as improving the understanding of what is happening within the population by, among other things, applying the concept of community policing (in a broader sense) were all mentioned by the experts.

*What can or should be done in the HRM department?*

On the question of what should or could be done by HRM departments, the experts made some general remarks. A first general remark is that gendarmerie-like forces must (continue to) invest in their human capital. This can be done by making the right choices ‘at the gate’ (recruitment and selection), by giving attention to the required or necessary adjustments in the education and training at the individual, tactical, as well as the strategic level in the respective organisations and by improving career development and career counselling and making them more effective, as well as more fit for purpose, in an ever-changing world. As is the case for many other organisations, it is important that gendarmerie-like organisations are adaptive, learning organisations in which continuous evaluation or assessment is vital and in which lessons identified and lessons learned are brought into the training loop.

A second general remark is that the HRM strategy and objectives should be in line with a clear vision on the future at the strategic leadership level of gendarmerie-like forces. Cooperation between HRM departments and the exchange of information, experiences and best practices between the different forces will be very supportive in this respect. The launch of a yearly magazine tracking future developments and giving ideas on how



to deal with these developments might provide a good opportunity for exchanging this kind of information.

Related to the previous remark, there is a final general observation to make. This concerns the specification of a clear vision and the core values that give direction for the future at the strategic level. A vision on the (new) role of the HRM function must be developed and implemented. Brainstorm sessions could be very helpful in this respect.

The experts also referred to other, more detailed HRM aspects. The first concerns the (re-) definition of HR profiles, with a focus on the question of what kind of personnel the forces need. The general expectation is that in line with new trends and new technologies:

- specialised personnel must be recruited;
- curricula must be updated;
- extra attention must be given to language skills, social media skills, adaptive and anticipation skills, and a multidisciplinary approach;
- personnel must be trained accordingly.

### *On planning*

Many gendarmerie forces have a culture in which planning and execution play a central role: based on a thorough analysis of the difference between the current situation and the desired situation, the resulting extensive plan takes them from the current to the future situation, followed by the execution of this plan. In addition, issues such as attention for structure, compliance with legislation, regulations and procedures, as well as effective leadership play an important role.

It has been argued that the future of gendarmeries and gendarmerie-like forces can be characterised as being volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous: the rate of change (volatility) is rapidly increasing, it is becoming less and less clear what will happen in the future (uncertainty), there is or will be a multiplicity of decision factors (complexity) and our observations are becoming increasingly difficult to interpret even though an appropriate amount of information is available (ambiguity).

Because of this future, the complexity of formulating and developing a plan increases exponentially. The need for information in planning and

execution phases strongly increases in terms of size (e.g. big data analytics) and time (e.g. real-time information processing). Less time will be available for the analysis of all information and the formulation of a plan and at the same time the expiration date of plans (strongly) reduces.

Gendarmeries need to adapt to the changing, dynamic, turbulent and complex environment in order to stay successful, or even survive. A consequent premise is that the gendarmerie must become a learning organisation in which knowledge and knowledge management plays a key role. The need to be or become a learning organisation seems unavoidable. The constant effort of understanding our environment, trying things out and learning from mistakes and our experiences in general will help gendarmeries to become learning organisations and help them to survive.

All experts involved underlined the need to improve in order to become 'gold medal winners', save lives, save money and save time. Furthermore, they pointed to the fact that the ambition to improve through the concept of 'learning organisation' was already laid down in the FIEP Way Ahead document, signed at the FIEP Summit in 2010.

Extra attention must be paid to the question of what significance should be given to future developments in relation to international missions. How will future developments – including issues such as accountability, local ownership, complementarity and the idea that a 'one-size-fits-all conflict area' no longer exists – influence future deployment? At the same time, with the increasing attention for proactive action and attention for the need for additional temporary basic executive policing capacity in disaster areas, the question should be addressed as to whether (in addition to a deployment during or after the conflict) a pre-conflict deployment could also be considered.

Finally, it was suggested to make a common list of 'lessons identified'.

### **Resilience as answer to the uncertain and vulnerable world**

In line with the trends described above, Brinkel referred to the uncertain and vulnerable future and pointed to resilience as a way to address such a

future.<sup>79</sup> He elaborated on the vulnerability of open, democratic, and plural societies vis à vis returning jihadists, undermining propaganda, economic pressure and manipulations of the truth. Furthermore, he emphasised the political, sociological and strategic developments related to western democracies. Referring to Putnam,<sup>80</sup> he argued that if the quality of social capital reduces, people will be more and more inclined to free-rider behaviour and neglect the civic duties that make possible the functioning of democracy.

Brinkel puts forward the concept of resilience in the face of the challenges associated with these uncertainties and vulnerabilities and points to the fact that this concept is being incorporated in security policies. Quoting Rodin, he defines resilience as “...the capacity of any entity – an individual, a community, an organisation, or a natural system – to prepare for disruptions, to recover from shocks and stresses, and to adapt and grow from a disruptive experience.”<sup>81</sup> Whereas NATO in this context relies on the concept of deterrence (by denial or deterrence), the EU mainly focuses on the importance of shared values. To underline this, Brinkel points to the EU’s Global Strategy document, stating that “to engage responsibly with the world, credibility is vital. The EU’s credibility hinges on our unity, on our many achievements, our enduring power of attraction, the effectiveness and consistency of our policies, and adherence to our values.”<sup>82</sup> He states that resilience requires a more fundamental approach on all levels: political, military, police and society in general. An approach in which values such as respect for and defence of human rights, individual freedoms and the rule of law are central.

More or less in line with the European approach is the Task Force on

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<sup>79</sup> Presentation by Theo Brinkel at the FIEP seminar held in Amsterdam on 19 February 2019.

<sup>80</sup> Putnam argues that traditional civil society organisations have lost significant importance and distinguishes social capital that binds together and social capital that builds bridges. Both forms coexist and reinforce each other. He argues that with the loss of cohesive social capital obstacles become larger and building bridges becomes more difficult. (Robert D. Putnam (2000), *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*, New York: Simon & Schuster).

<sup>81</sup> Judith Rodin (2014), *The Resilience Dividend: Being Strong in a World Where Things Go Wrong*. London, Profile Books Ltd.

<sup>82</sup> EU, *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe - A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy*, June 2016.

Extremism in Fragile States' report, drawn up by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), stating that the future policy should be the prevention of underlying causes of extremism by addressing and resolving grievances, bolstering social cohesion, increasing citizens trust in the government or state and by establishing inclusive governance processes and community consultations.<sup>83</sup>

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<sup>83</sup> The US Congress tasked the USIP to “develop a comprehensive plan to prevent the underlying causes of extremism in fragile states” (USIP, Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States, *Preventing Extremism in Fragile States - A New Approach*, final report (Washington, USIP, February 2019)).

## 5. Cooperation: more than a buzzword

If we look closely at the FIEP statutes, the promotion of mutual relationships and gendarmerie and police cooperation are central themes. The association seeks recognition as an instrument of police cooperation, capable of leading concrete actions.<sup>84</sup> Existing mutual cooperation was central during most of the discussions held during the Dutch presidency. Calls for more uniform and joint curricula and joint pre-deployment training were particularly frequent during those discussions.

In the context of the 'learning organisation', cooperation with independent academics and/or research institutes was also discussed.

In this chapter, two subjects will be dealt with successively: the framework of international cooperation and measuring success in terms of output and outcome.

### International cooperation

While a substantial proportion of the experts' contributions provides suggestions for enhancing international cooperation, the contribution by Judge-Heijboer offers a theoretical framework for that subject.<sup>85</sup> This framework reflects six levels of international cooperation and their mutual relationships and enables us to see various activities with respect to cooperation in relation to each other; it can also show future perspectives. All levels of cooperation contribute and influence each other. Judge-Heijboer explains how international cooperation programmes could strengthen gendarmeries' future missions and points to the necessity for cooperation due to the fact that future missions will be joint, interagency, and multinational. Judge-Heijboer continues by stating that well-managed and organised cooperation programmes contribute to the enhancement of interoperability as one of the factors of influence regarding effectiveness.<sup>86</sup>

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<sup>84</sup> Statutes of the International Association of Gendarmes and Police Forces with Military Status (available on [www.fiep.org](http://www.fiep.org))

<sup>85</sup> Anne Judge-Heijboer (2017). Closing NATO Policing gaps together: multinational force interoperability between the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee and the United States Army Military Police.

<sup>86</sup> Anne Judge-Heijboer, (2019), *From Hosted Dinner to Integrated Police Units: How international cooperation programmes strengthen gendarmeries' future missions* (Netherlands Defence Academy, Breda, The Netherlands).

**Table 2: International Cooperation Pyramid  
(Judge-Heijboer)**



With regard to future missions of gendarmeries, the survey held previously by the FIEP presidency and the further discussions recognise areas for closer cooperation between gendarmerie-like forces in relation to international missions. The possibilities mentioned are: pre-deployment training, live training exercises, the formation of rapidly deployable units or specialised police teams and the enhancement of interoperability in terms of procedures and equipment. At the moment, it seems that there is currently a dearth of multinational exercises with regard to the future missions of gendarmeries. Also interesting in this regard is the contribution in which Rommel points to the worldwide presence of many gendarmerie-like forces, which allows them to reinforce their international cooperation by gathering their means and skills in specific structures, thus leveraging their international commitment and developing their interoperability.<sup>87</sup>

Whereas the Senior Council of General Commanders and Directors of FIEP decided in The Hague in October 2010 to enhance cooperation between FIEP members and to use the association as a catalyst for further professionalisation

<sup>87</sup> Rommel (2019).

within gendarmeries, the further development of the gendarmerie concept (after defining more precisely gendarmerie-specific fields of knowledge and expertise) and a platform for the exchange of best practises, one can conclude that cooperation within FIEP still does not exceed the level of developing and maintaining international contacts and relations.<sup>88</sup> Once again, proposals have been made to add cooperation in the field of academic research, the creation of (on-line) platforms and the creation of a network of centres of excellence to the activities of FIEP.<sup>89</sup>

Other contributions by experts demonstrate a wish or necessity of having theoretical frameworks and doctrines (or a common understanding of frameworks and doctrines) and a common or shared analysis and development of topics that affect the functions and roles of police in the international context;<sup>90</sup> they also point to the enhancement of interoperability through common training, exercises, the exchange of officers, the exchange of 'best practices' and joint operations together with fellow gendarmes or police officers.<sup>91</sup> By doing so, effectiveness and efficiency in future international missions can benefit.

Although not directly related to future international missions, three issues arise with regard to international cooperation: (1) the still present need to raise the familiarity and visibility of the gendarmerie concept and FIEP among third parties; (2) the significant enlargement of FIEP (and the subsequent questions as how to organise FIEP's activities in the future, as well as the criteria for applying and becoming a FIEP member); (3) the fact that international cooperation reaches a higher lever if the cooperating forces are based in neighbouring countries.

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<sup>88</sup> Dutch FIEP presidency 2010, *Enhanced Cooperation and Better Known: Way Ahead FIEP 2010-2015*, The Hague, 19 October 2010; Reflections on the outcomes of the survey of the Dutch FIEP presidency, the HRM expert meeting held 3-6 December 2018 in Amsterdam and the seminar held in Amsterdam 18-21 February 2019.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid.

<sup>90</sup> D.V. Trobiuk, (2019), *Gendarmerie forces in future international peacekeeping missions*, Kharkiv, Ukraine.i

<sup>91</sup> E.g. Gonzalez Araneda and Touibi Mohamed Hedi, (2019) *Gendarmerie-like forces in future international missions*, Tunis, Tunisia.

## Measuring success in terms of output and outcome

The deployment of gendarmerie-like forces is a global response to violent conflicts where public order and security, as well as justice, human rights and the rule of law are under pressure or even partly absent or absent. Organised crime, including extremism conducive to terrorism, affects public safety, the livelihoods of communities and the conservation of nature and (cultural) heritage. Adapting their characteristics to the mission context,<sup>92</sup> gendarmerie-like forces often come to the fore in war-torn countries experiencing so-called ‘public security gaps’.<sup>93</sup> The forces carry out tasks that either fall under the temporary and/or partial replacement of the indigenous police, or support or reinforce this local police through training, monitoring, mentoring and advice.

Safety and security are fundamental to lasting and self-sustaining peace and development and, at the same time, major concerns, especially in fragile and war-torn countries. Increased levels of crime, violence and disorder often occur. The spoiler threat from criminalised power structures that, according to the studies of Dziedzic,<sup>94</sup> are the predominant cause of failure of peace and stability operations, is the major challenge for international missions.

With regard to insight into the tasks performed by gendarmeries during international missions so far, apart from concrete results, data and information on output is almost non-existent.<sup>95</sup> Besides outcomes such as the number of persons arrested or weapons confiscated, little to no attention is paid to (possible) indicators which point to an increase in the general population’s confidence in the police, the reduction of crime and an increase in a sense of

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<sup>92</sup> In the Balkans these characteristics were more civilian and in Afghanistan more military (See a.o. Cornelius Friesendorf (2017), *Gendarmeries in Multinational Operations in Journal of International Peacekeeping*, Vol 21 (2017), 125-151.

<sup>93</sup> E.g. Michael J. Dziedzic (1998).

<sup>94</sup> Michael Dziedzic (ed),(2016). As early as 2006, Rausch offered an approach based on the (negative) impact of crimes on the stabilisation in post-intervention society. She defines a ‘serious crime’ as a criminal act or acts that can have a profoundly destabilising impact on a post-conflict society (see: C. Rausch (ed), (2006), *Combating Serious Crimes in Postconflict Societies: A Handbook for Policymakers and Practitioners*. Washington, DC United States, Institute of Peace Press, 3-15.

<sup>95</sup> Friesendorf, 150-151.



security or a sense of safety. Together with Friesendorf, one could argue that little is known about the impact of all activities of gendarmerie-like forces in international missions.

It has been argued before that the changes we are experiencing today will in future play a substantial role in creating a volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous world. All gendarmerie-like forces will be confronted by these changes and will have to adapt to the changes (to at least a substantial level). This also goes for future international missions. Bringing together ministers, chiefs of police and gendarmerie and police representatives from almost two hundred countries in June 2018, the Second UN Chiefs of Police Summit expressed a commitment to strengthen the ability to effectively prevent and address security threats before these transcend borders.<sup>96</sup> The future and already announced shift in emphasis can also be found in a contribution by Caparini, who argues that UN police can play a critical role in conflict prevention through:

*“... (a) direct operational actions aimed at mediating and defusing tensions and deterring violence; (b) structural prevention linked to capacity-building activities of mentoring, training and advising host state police, as well as supporting the development of more effective, accountable and legitimate law enforcement institutions; and (c) systemic prevention through support for international and regional norms and mechanisms to combat transnational organized crime, illicit arms flows and human trafficking”.*<sup>97</sup>

For the sake of remaining concise, one could conclude that future international missions will show an increasing emphasis on conflict prevention, can be characterised as interconnected, uncertain and ambiguous, and will be increasingly influenced by exponentially developing technologies and the use of modern techniques of communication (e.g. social media).

As mentioned before, the experts focused on the systematic collection of data and information regarding the contribution of gendarmerie-like forces to the (sustainable) establishment of public order and security in international missions.

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<sup>96</sup> <https://police.un.org/en/UNCOPS2018>

<sup>97</sup> Marina Caparini (2018).

Before collecting data, a necessary and first step is to determine what constitutes ‘good’ or ‘successful’ (international) policing. A second step is to develop appropriate indicators enabling us to measure the degree of success.

For several decades, there has been a desire among police professionals to quantify the performance of police forces as a path towards social accountability. This drive is reinforced by the demand from donor countries and organisations for insight into this performance in international missions. Being accountable for the essence of police work – and the extent of it – could yield a great deal for the police (and gendarmerie-like forces). In particular, they can learn from things that went well and from things that went less well. Only in this way can an improvement process be started.

Academic literature on the subject shows that three particular outcomes of policing activities are important: improvement of safety and security, the public’s confidence in the police organisation, and police responsiveness to the victims of crimes.<sup>98</sup>

Police activities and police output are traditional police performance indicators, for example the number arrests, seizures of illegal drugs or arms, and crimes solved. The Vera Institute continues and concludes that *“those indicators reveal more about what officers do with their time and resources than whether they are adequately serving the needs of all citizens and whether citizens, particularly those who are poor and otherwise disadvantaged, trust and value the police”*.<sup>99</sup>

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<sup>98</sup> E.g. Vera Institute (2003), *Measuring Progress toward Safety and Justice: A Global Guide to the Design of Performance Indicators across the Justice Sector*, Vera Institute of Justice, New York; Carolyn Whitzman et al (2006), *Community Safety Indicator Project, Research Report*, University of Melbourne; Mark H. Moore and Anthony Braga (2003), *The “Bottom Line” of Policing: What Citizens Should Value (and Measure!) in Police Performance*, Police Executive Research Forum; Ben A. Vollaard (2006), *Police Effectiveness: Measurement and Incentives*, Pardee RAND Graduate School dissertation; Peter Neyroud (2008), ‘Past, Present and Future Performance: Lessons and Prospects for the Measurement of Police Performance’, *Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice*, Volume 2, Issue 3, 2008, 340–348; Sparrow, Malcolm K. (2015), ‘Measuring Performance in a Modern Police Organization. New Perspectives’ in *Policing Bulletin*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice.

<sup>99</sup> Vera Institute, 2003

Traditional indicators are the crime rate and the form of crime. A well-known limitation of the use of criminal statistics concerns unknown criminality – often referred to as a ‘dark number’.

Measuring public perception of police effectiveness is problematic: there is no ‘acceptable’ level of perceived police effectiveness, nor are agreed measures consistently used in evaluations.

An example of measuring the impact of international or multinational police missions is the diagnostic tool developed by Princeton University in 2006: the Police Reform Indicators and Measurement Evaluation (PRIME) tool.<sup>100</sup> The tool offers a more comprehensive and systematic way of assessing police reform outcomes in post-conflict environments.

In the expert session in June 2019, two aspects were of relevance: (1) the measurement of outputs and outcomes of contributions of gendarmerie-like forces to international missions; (2) involvement of (independent) academics and/or research institutes in the development of instruments and the actual measuring process.

The experts gathered in the meetings found it difficult to define success, due to their idea that success depends on the type of mission being evaluated. However, the experts pointed to three key elements of successful police missions: (1) the level of safety and security; (2) the level of people’s trust in their police; (3) the level of responsiveness of police with respect to the public (especially victims). Addressing the question of how to measure success, the experts – again – felt that this was difficult. They all agreed the necessity of measuring success, especially in the light of the importance of sustainability, and that the result should be more than a mere ‘mission accomplished’. The suggestion was made to develop a system in which general principles for operational indicators (police effectiveness, rule of law, quality of public order and safety, crime rates, compliance with human rights, absence or level of corruption, people’s trust in their police) and more administrative indicators (internal functioning police, salary, equipment, financial systems, training facilities) could be connected to the phases in the mission by levels. The experts called for a multiple case study research (with various police missions as single case studies) to find reliable indicators. The general principles uncovered by these case studies could be of use in this area.

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<sup>100</sup> Bajraktari, et al (2006), *The PRIME System: Measuring the Success of Post-Conflict Police Reform*, Princeton University.

# PART THREE

# REFLECTION

*"Everyone thinks of changing the world, but no one thinks of changing himself"*

*(Leo Tolstoy)*

## **6. DEFENDING THE STRONGHOLD, ADAPTING OR REINVENTING?**

This book started with a prologue, intended to break free from the daily concerns and to take the reader to a possible future scenario. While the prologue took the year 2035 as a starting point, possible trends were extrapolated to the year 2050. The scenario presented requires a radical change within the gendarmeries, but as also indicated in the introductory chapter, the prologue describes only one of many possible future scenarios.

The time horizon for the various expert meetings during the Dutch presidency of FIEP was limited to ten to fifteen years. Questions concerning future policing, future international missions, and the future security-gendarmeries nexus were raised and discussed by the experts and specialists of the affiliated gendarmerie-like forces. This chapter reflects on the issues raised, as well as the future surveys conducted during the Dutch presidency.

### **Introduction**

At the start of the Dutch presidency of FIEP ‘gendarmerie-like forces in future international missions’ had been chosen as the central theme. This theme was chosen to highlight and discuss expeditionary police action in a crisis environment where either action is taken independently or local capacities are built up by means of training, advising, assisting and monitoring. An additional reason for this choice was that participation in international missions is a fact of life for most of gendarmeries, despite the divergent tasks of the affiliated forces. Moreover, it was considered pre-eminently a gendarmerie theme, because it refers to the connection between the expeditionary, military character of the gendarmerie in combination with the police task.

Although the theme was broad enough to offer opportunities to go into various sub-topics such as local ownership, monitoring, mentoring and advisory activities, and crisis management, or to make a link with education and training, it quickly became apparent that it was so closely associated with gendarmerie-like forces in general, that a too strong adherence to the theme would not be very fruitful.

The explorations of the theme undertaken by young and older experts from the various gendarmerie-like forces produced a varied picture. Two important elements played a role in the many discussions: the changing security situation and the nature of future changes. Questions were raised about the impact of the upcoming changes. The possible approaches or solutions to deal with these changes were also discussed.

Looking back, strictly speaking four approaches to future challenges are possible: take no action and hope that gendarmerie-like forces are unaffected; defend the current position of and working methods within the forces, albeit with (marginal) adjustments; respond adaptively; and, finally, reinvent the gendarmerie-like force as a provider of peace, security and order. The following sections will discuss the conclusions that can be drawn on the theme of the Dutch presidency and the method used. The chapter will end with a number of cautious recommendations.

### **Short reflection on the outcome**

Looking back on the project, in which this publication represents an important milestone, four kinds of reflections must be made. The first is about the uniqueness, character and added value of the gendarmerie concept, the second is about the ‘planning paradigm’, the third is about adaptivity and the final reflection describes a number of concrete proposals.

#### *The uniqueness of gendarmeries*

As is often claimed (and underlined during the many discussions in the project during the Dutch Presidency), gendarmerie-like forces are ideally suited to carry out police tasks under difficult and often less stable circumstances because of their specific characteristics. While the focus in the first instance was mainly on international missions and it turned out that the demand for deployment abroad of gendarmerie-like forces is increasingly becoming diverse (due to the often complex and hybrid security situations), the demand for deployment in their home countries is also unprecedented for many forces. In addition, it appears that internal and external security are increasingly intertwined. There is no clear line between them anymore and a growing number of police activities is becoming transnational. Now that forces are increasingly meeting each other internationally, it is deemed wise to make use of each other's experiences and expertise, for example in the area of capacity issues, training and mission preparation.

Three observations must be mentioned in relation to the perfect match between the (characteristics of) gendarmerie-like forces and their deployment abroad, especially as first responders in the so-called ‘public security gap’.

The first observation refers to the uniqueness of the character and subsequent added value of the gendarmerie-like forces. Their characteristics and added values must be cherished. Gendarmerie-like forces can rightly be proud of who they are and what they have achieved in international missions as well as in their home countries. However, claiming exclusive rights for whatever deployment as a police force does no justice to their -by nature- limited (police) resources and the capabilities that others have or have acquired.<sup>101</sup> As Neuteboom already pointed out in chapter 2, gendarmeries cannot provide a universal or long-term solution to security gaps. And at the same time, it does no justice to the processes of the constabularisation of the military and the militarisation of police who, adapting to the changing security situation and limited resources, now perform security tasks that originally were originally performed by either the police or the military.

A second observation refers to the employment of the national police system of the deployed forces abroad. This implies prejudice regarding what is considered a good or the best police system; a system that may not necessarily meet locale needs or fit into the local context.

When existing police systems are seen as empirical organisational realities that have developed historically,<sup>102</sup> one can distinguish between functional (generalist versus specialist) and geographical (national, regional or local) ways of structuring. Even in Europe, in countries with gendarmerie-like forces most police systems and their functions differ, as do those in South America, Africa and the Middle East. The police systems and their functions are laid down in national laws and regulations. Underlying police philosophies or models often dictate or indicate how police should act and are related to the national or local cultural context and often tempt to define the police system or policing as ‘right’ or ‘wrong’. It is exactly this ‘mechanism’, that can

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<sup>101</sup> See note 4.

<sup>102</sup> E. Devroe and P. Ponsaers (2017), European National Police Systems and Metropolitan Realities, in E. Devroe, A. Edwards, P. Ponsaers, (eds.). *Policing European Metropolises, The Politics of Security in City-Regions*, London and New York: Routledge, 35-86.

give rise to a feeling of superiority for the own national police system or the concept of gendarmerie, instead of taking in a self-confident position. This mechanism can also make the difference when gendarmerie-like forces and police need to know the local context in order to be successful in a sustainable rebuilding or reform of the indigenous police. One of the prime questions in this regard is whether the police is legitimised by the consent of the people (mainly Anglo-Saxon) or is to uphold the rules and powers of the state. In certain stages after conflict, an initial state-centric approach might be useful or necessary. However, the successful establishment of a local gendarmerie in the early post-conflict phase does not guarantee sustainable police reform, nor is it proof of successful deployment of the gendarmerie in international missions. To a large extent, a successful ‘intervention’ by the police mission is determined by the degree to which attention has been given to the local context.

A third observation concerns the limited attention that seemed to be given to the role that ICT has or can have for gendarmerie-like forces during future international missions. Considering the role that social media play or can play in strengthening public-police relations and trust in the police, as well as recognising potential spoilers of peace, attention to social media within the gendarmeries would be more than appropriate. Moreover, it could be argued that – if cyber warfare increasingly becomes part of wider conflict – organisations such as the United Nations will find it necessary to carry out an activity akin to ‘cyber peacekeeping’. Here again, gendarmerie-like forces could raise the question of whether or not to get involved in this process.<sup>103</sup>

### *The planning paradigm*

The predominant motives and drivers for thinking and acting, as witnessed during the project, seem to be those that can be connected to systems, structures, procedures planning and control. A first explanation for this could be found in the short-time horizon the experts addressed, which subconsciously led them to the pitfall of only walking the beaten track. Another explanation could be found in the training, education and experience of the experts, which tells them that the system approach is a good way

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<sup>103</sup> Michael Robinson et al (2018) ‘An Introduction to Cyber Peacekeeping’ in *Journal of Network and Computer Applications*, April 2018, 1-21.



to reduce uncertainty. After all, many gendarmerie forces have a culture in which planning and execution play a central role: based on a thorough analysis of the difference between the current situation and the desired situation, an extensive plan is drawn up to take them from the current to the future situation, followed by the execution of this plan. In addition, issues such as attention for structure, compliance with laws, regulations and procedures, as well as effective leadership play an important role as well.

However, as the rate of change is rapidly increasing and situations become more complex and ambiguous, the complexity of formulating and developing a plan increases exponentially. The need for information in planning and execution phases strongly increases in terms of volume (e.g. big data analytics) and time (e.g. real-time information processing). Less time will be available for the analysis of all information and the formulation of a plan, while at the same time the expiration date of plans strongly reduces. So, the question that remains is whether ‘the old cap still fits’.

### *Adaptivity*

Change will be a dominant and constant factor in the future. The ever-increasing uncertainty and rising ambiguity raises the question of whether the organisation structure and the working methods used in gendarmerie organisations so far are adequate and whether rational planning methodologies, even with the help of large automated systems, are obsolete.

On several occasions, the experts argued that the challenges of today and tomorrow can only be countered by a strategy that addresses recruitment and selection, training and education and the organisational culture. A path must be taken in which adaptivity, innovation, learning and making mistakes (to learn from them) are permitted and where leadership with empathy and vision that gives directions rather than directive leadership is central. As is the case for many other organisations, it is important that gendarmerie-like forces are adaptive learning organisations in which continuous evaluation or assessment is vital and in which lessons identified and lessons learned are brought into the training loop.

Finally, it was argued that the gendarmerie-like forces could greatly benefit from exchanging experiences (e.g. by means of a periodical HRM magazine) and from establishing or intensifying cooperation with (external) researchers and research institutes in order to increase the critical and self-critical ability

of the forces, including the measurement of outputs and outcomes of international police missions.

*Final remarks on the outcome*

Now is a time to touch briefly on the concrete proposals put forward regarding professionalism within the forces and cooperation between the forces. Most striking were the proposals for the enhancement of interoperability, the expansion of pre-deployment training, and the training and assignment of rapidly deployable units, as well as the proposals to enhance post-deployment evaluation, to improve recordings of the outcomes of FIEP commission meetings, and to improve the way central themes are approached during the FIEP presidencies and possible seminars.

Other proposals that came up that are worthwhile mentioning are the (further) introduction of the concept of the ‘learning organisation’, where FIEP can act as platform and catalyst to exchange bests practices, keeping in mind that every force or country has its own way of dealing with the subject. In line with this, it was suggested to draw up a common list of lessons identified.

Finally, there was a call to perform a multiple case study, with various police missions as single case studies. Examining these case studies and comparing them could help to find reliable indicators to measure the outputs and outcomes of international missions.

### **Feedback on the process**

Looking back at the implementation of the project, three things require attention: the gradual and incremental adjustment of the theme; the duration of the meetings and composition of the participants in the meetings; and the participants themselves.

The advancing insight into the coherence and complexity of many aspects of the chosen theme made it obvious that deployment to international police missions cannot be viewed separately from the commitments of gendarmerie-like forces within the national context. For that reason, the focus gradually shifted more to the gendarmeries as such, with – where possible – an excursion to police missions abroad. Occasionally, the shifting focus of the theme resulted in a smaller match between the participants and the subject. The result was that in those cases the subject could only be discussed in less

depth and that the results were less generally valid than expected.

This brings us to the approach to the theme during the Dutch presidency. Based on the thoughts and discussions that took place surrounding the transfer of the presidency from the Turkish Gendarmerie to the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee in 2018, it was decided in Amsterdam in December 2018 to organise expert meetings (related to the topic) in parallel with each committee meeting. Together with the separate seminar, the presidency wanted to give substance to the chosen theme.

For the input and processing of the experts' contributions arising from those meetings, the Dutch FIEP presidency launched a long-running project in which a mix of ideas and opinions of mid-level officers of the gendarmeries, the reactions of their respective general headquarters and a more academic reflection on the results was intended to (finally) serve as 'food for thought' for the leadership of the gendarmeries and gendarmerie-like forces associated within FIEP.

The composition of the various expert groups often differed. While the expectations of the participants in the expert sessions varied and the experts in many cases did not know each other, additional time had to be devoted to becoming more deeply acquainted with both each other and the subject. The varying composition of the group of experts also meant that the 'visions on the future' had to be shared first. Considering the time available for the expert sessions, there was usually only little time left for genuinely substantive discussions on the subject.

Due to the fact that most participants of the seminar were the authors of the essays written and due to the fact that the seminar lasted two days, much more time was available for a more in-depth discussion on the different aspects of the future of gendarmerie-like forces.

A final remark in this respect concerns the feedback received during the presidency. Although the intentions of the Dutch FIEP presidency were to give all participants and corps sufficient opportunity to respond or reflect on the reports prepared on the basis of the meetings, relatively little use was made of this option.

Finally, the participants themselves. They were often practitioners whose knowledge and level of experience differed. It was striking how proud the

participants were of their own forces and how they talked about them with great commitment and passion. Moreover, they all seemed convinced that the gendarmerie corps had to change in view of the major challenges in the future.

Unfortunately, the Dutch presidency failed to push the horizon of that future far enough away from 2019. As a result, some participants fell into the trap of improving and adapting existing solutions to tackle (future) challenges and uncertainties.

### **What could be the next step?**

The composition of the gendarmerie-like forces affiliated with FIEP varies from ‘grand old lady’ to ‘teenager’. Various forces were created from or along the lines of the *French Gendarmerie National*. At the same time, the forces are part of their own national police systems, which were in turn historically determined and are seen as symbols of the nation state.<sup>104</sup> It is therefore not surprising that the way in which the forces respond, or fail to respond, to views on the future differ.

Almost all organisations, including gendarmerie-like forces, have to deal with changes in their environment, such as political, economic and social changes, changing demands from the government, the population or customers, climate change and demographic change.

This chapter started with four possible responses to future challenges: taking no action, defending one's own territory, adapting and, lastly, reinventing oneself.

The first two reactions could arise on the basis of self-satisfaction or a sense of superiority, with a certain blindness or unfamiliarity with the effects of future changes on the environment of gendarmerie-like forces. However, the experiences gained during the Dutch FIEP presidency in no way fuel these thoughts. Rather, there is a widely shared belief within the group of experts of affiliated gendarmeries, present at the meetings, that much will indeed change. At the same time there is some uncertainty about the scope and impact of the future changes.

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<sup>104</sup> E.g. E. Devroe and P. Ponsaers (2017); J. Casey (2010), 107.

Finally, the last two options regarding the response to future challenges remain. In both options the starting point for change is the existing situation: the gendarmerie-like forces as they are in 2019. Whereas in the option of adaptation the current situation is clear, in the option of reinvention this situation is unclear and complex.

Two different levels of change or adaptation can be distinguished. On the first level, the current situation is known, future challenges and potential problems are recognised, and the solutions are clear. The environment of gendarmerie-like forces remains largely stable and it is clear what needs to be done to adjust and make improvements, an approach in which the existing strategies, structures and culture remain (almost) the same. Only work routines and technical systems are adjusted.

The second level focuses on renewing the existing, known situation. However, it is not yet entirely clear what the trends for the future will result in. An important point of attention is therefore the question of what that future might look like, in which desired situation this new future situation ends and how gendarmerie-like forces can move towards this new situation. With this second level of adjustment, the strategy, structure, culture and technology of the forces may change. The range of tasks or the focus within them, the working methods, forms of cooperation with other organisations and the behaviour of people in the forces may also be part of the changes.

In the event of reinvention,<sup>105</sup> the current situation is unclear and complex, and the future is complicated and uncertain. In fact, everything can be subject to change. The changing environment puts gendarmerie-like forces under pressure. Existing working methods, techniques and organisational structures must be reconsidered or modified due to technological changes, changes in the nature and extent of crime, migration pressure and other security threats. At the same time, government requirements and the demands of the population may also require adjustment. And yes, even the right to exist might be questioned by others.<sup>106</sup>

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<sup>105</sup> See for almost similar approaches or pleas: David H Bayley (2016), 'The Complexities of 21 Century Policing', *Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice*, Volume 10, Number 3, 163–170; Clifford Shearing and Monique Marks (2011), 'Being a New Police in the Liquid 21st Century', *Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice*, Volume 5, Issue 3, September 2011, 210–218.

<sup>106</sup> As mentioned earlier, the role of the military (including gendarmerie-like forces) in the national context is disputed by several authors. E.g. M. Dewar (1985) and M. Rasmussen (1999).

If gendarmerie forces want to remain an important player within the security domain, they will have to adapt to the changing world around them. To be able to give direction to these changes, a clear and perhaps recalibrated vision of the relevance and role of these forces is needed. Subsequently, existing strategies, structures and work processes will have to be reviewed, not forgetting, however, that changing or further developing the workforce – the gendarmes – is key to a successful transition to an adaptive, innovative and agile force.

Since holding on to existing structures and processes appears to be a dominant pattern within gendarmerie-like forces, and given that a possibly too rigid adherence to these structures and processes will only lead to a very tough change process, this aspect has to be given special attention.

At the same time, gendarmerie-like forces must focus even more attention on the possibilities and limitations of using new technologies, in particular ICT, in order to be and remain successful.

In addition, further consideration must be given to the indicators that make the degree of success more visible. In that context, special attention is needed for the openness of gendarmerie-like forces and the further possibilities for assessing together with independent researchers and research institutes the various aspects within the forces, such as the development of instruments, in order to be able to assess – as objectively as possible – the performance of the forces, especially in police missions abroad.

Developments take place in rapid succession. It is mainly the speed with which this happens and the related complexity, ambiguity and uncertainty that make it essential for gendarmerie-like forces to adapt. Contemporary, but especially future challenges and (hybrid) security threats make the forces a logical first responder due to their specific characteristics, values and competence at preventing and investigating criminal offences, and restoring and maintaining public order. This applies within the national context, but certainly also with regard to international police missions, where there is sometimes a serious lack of suitable police capabilities. As a result, gendarmerie-like forces are put under pressure and perhaps choices must be made (owing to the - by nature - limited (police) resources). A further increase in the number of gendarmes is possible, but will not be enough to cope with all of the security challenges.

Adaptation is necessary and reinvention of the gendarmerie concept might be desirable. At the interface of adaptation and reinvention, it might be wise to look again at the social and international relevance of gendarmerie-like forces and launch a study based on the strengths and values of gendarmerie-like forces, but with an eye for (future) developments in and around the forces; not to form an elite, but to be the best of their kind, to determine who the gendarmerie-like forces want to be, what they stand for, how they connect to each other and respect the values they stand for; forces able to perform transnational and robust proximity policing, both complementary and adaptive.

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